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CHAPTER ONE; INTRODUCTION
 
According to most accounts, the largest budget reduction in American
 
history was enacted with the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act. The bulk
 
of these reductions was in the domestic transfer programs, particularly
 
entitlements, and yet general federal spending continued its increase
 
in fiscal year 1982, as did overall authority and spending for the domestic
 
transfer programs. Contrary to popular belief, what was reduced was the
 
percentage growth rate of federal budget authority and outlays in selected
 
programs from what they could have been, not the growth of federal spending
 
per se.
 
Much of the growth in the federal budget is associated with the con
 
tinuing expansion of what are called budget uncontrollables-^-interest on
 
the public debt, farm price supports, prior contractual obligations, general
 
revenue sharing and entitlements. Uncontrollable spending——and this is
 
synon3nn.ous with relatively uncontrollable under existing law—has risen
 
from 73% of total budget outlays in fiscal 1975, to over 76% in fiscal
 
1981.^ The dominant form of these uncontrollables is the entitlement cate
 
gory. It has risen from a $32.3 billion dollar budget commitment in 1965,
 
to a $316.6 billion dollar obligation for fiscal 1981. The major entitle
 
ments have more than doubled since 1973, and many have tripled(See Tables
 
1-A and 1-B).
 
But having said all that simply puts one safely within the descriptive
 
perspective of the regular literature concerning United States budget de
 
ficits and the problems of spending controls. To understand some of the
 
deeper dimensions of these problems requires a focused, concentrated exa
 
mination of the principal issues which comprise the spending control debate.
 
  
 
 
 
TABLE 1_A U.S. BUDGETARY OUTLAYS FOR HEALTH CARE. FY 1973-1985
 
(In Billions of Dollars)
 
$Billions $Billions
 
100 100
 
80 __ 80
 
TOTAL-^
 
60	 ^ MEDICAI^,,-^
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Fiscal Years (Estimate)
 
TABLE 1-B U.S. BUDGETARY OUTLAYS FOR INCOME SECURITY, FY 1973-1985
 
(In Billions of Dollars)
 
$Billions $Billions
 
300' -300
 
TOTAL
 
250 250
 
•
 
UNEMPLOYMENT
 
COMPENSATION
 
200 200
 
150 SOCIAL SECURITY 150
 
100 100
 
OTHER RETIREMENT AND
 
50 DISABILITY. 50
 
GENERAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
 
0.
 i ' I \ \ t I L L
 
1973 74 75 16 71 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
 
Fiscal Years (Estimate)
 
SOURCE: 	The U.S. Budget in Brief for Fiscal Year 1983, Office of Management
 
and Budget, pp. 57, 60.
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One such issue, and the one this thesis examines, is entitlements. What
 
exactly are entitlements and how do they work? Why are they so difficult
 
to regulate financially? Once legislated, can they in fact be controlled?
 
If so, how?
 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer those questions in order to
 
contribute to an understanding of how and why entitlement outlays remain
 
such a persistent problem of control within the congressional budgetary
 
process—a process originally designed to give Congress the power to
 
control federal spending. Entitlement spending, representing nearly 50%
 
of annual budgetary authority and growing,^ has not been brought under
 
such control. Is Congress—even in cooperation with the President and further,
 
even without creating any new entitlements—^capable of holding down en
 
titlement spending? This thesis argues that without fundamental structural
 
change in the way entitlements are handled within the budgetary process,
 
Congress does not now have the capacity to control entitlement spending.
 
Methodology and Limitations
 
This thesis will utilize the style of policy analysis popularized by
 
the Congressional Budget Office under Alice M. Rivlin. Such style employs
 
a modified content analysis of government documents and other data to ascer
 
tain the prevailing patterns relevant to one or several issues (in this
 
case, entitlements); a presentation of the available plans, options, and
 
strategies to modify or fundamentally change those patterns, with an analysis
 
of the strengths and weaknesses of each option or strategy; and finally an
 
evaluation of a broad compilation of suggested future options and strategies,
 
including estimated cost factors associated with each of them.
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This methodology will be used to investigate and discuss:
 
(a.) The nature of entitlements within the budgetary process, in
 
cluding the major problems in controlling entitlement spending,
 
(b.) Congressional options for controlling entitlement spending in
 
the 1980*s.
 
(c.) Future strategies and options for controlling specific types of
 
entitlement spending.
 
There are several important limitations inherent in this thesis. One is
 
the absence of a lengthy historical perspective outside of that necessary
 
to properly identify entitlements and how they became such a gargantuan
 
budgetary problem. This thesis seeks to add to modern scholarship on whe
 
ther and how congressional spending can be brought back into a controlled
 
focus more appropriately tailored to this nation's means, resources, and
 
needs. Since the first moderately effective effort at putting at least a
 
temporary leash on entitlement spending was not enacted until the 1980
 
Reconciliation Act, for the purposes of this thesis, a lengthier, more
 
detailed historical perspective is not justified. It is enough, to note
 
that the political strategies^of the 1960*s and 1970's mainly sought to
 
expand government spending, not to reduce it; and even when those strategies
 
did seek fiscal restraint, entitlements were never successfully curtailed,
 
they just grew into bigger budgetary obligations.
 
Furthermore, the pre-1980'a period has already been abundantly described
 
within the available literature, although discussions of entitlement spen
 
ding were most usually seen as only one of numerous budgetary irritants
 
rather than a problem of special significance.^
 
 -4­
The second limitation is that this thesis focuses almost exclusively
 
on entitlements as a problem of budgetary control. It does not discuss
 
entitlements as an issue of class--oriented redistributive politics,
 
although entitlements, as a major dimension of the federal government's
 
transfer payment-redistribution efforts, is most certainly such an issue.^
 
Restrictions of scope and organization preclude such a discussion here.
 
The third major limitation is one of sources. Even though there has
 
recently been much hue and cry concerning entitlements, there is very
 
little primary literature available which analyzes entitlements within
 
the budgetary process. The preponderance of the literature that is
 
available is from journals like the Congressional Quarterly and the
 
National Journal, newspapers, and the special projects done by various
 
authors under the umbrella of the Congressional Budget Office publica
 
tions. The sources utilized in this thesis reflect that paucity.
 
This Thesis and the Currently Available Literature
 
All of the currently published literature which purports to describe,
 
analyze, examine or otherwise discuss the federal budget and its major
 
problems mention entitlements at least once, and usually several times.
 
Some sources, like Ellwood's recent study of the 1981 Reconciliation Act
 
8
 
budget cuts, spend a great deal of time describing and defining entitle
 
ments and other income transfer programs. Ippolito's contributions are of
 
9 10
 
that ilk, as is Schick's, Congress and Money. But therein lies the major
 
problem of entitlements within the literature; the lack of a consistent,
 
coherent and accurate definition/description of exactly what programs are
 
entitlements. This is not to say there is no standard definition—there
 
certainly is. Entitlements are legislated government "programs in which
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spending is governed by a law making all who meet their requirements eli
 
gible to receive payments, But apparently, in so innocuous: a definition,
 
there is ample room for interpretation.
 
Thus, in Ellwood, the Food Stamps Program is an entitlement, and in at
 
least one major Congressional Budget Office publication, it is also iden-­
12 13
 
tified as such, while in another, it is not. Ellwood, Schick and Ippo­
lito all include interest on the public debt as part of what is called man
 
datory spending, and/or the general category of uncontrollahles. The CB,0,
 
14
 in one study, labels that interest as an entitlement, as does the Donnelly
 
special report on entitlements in a recent Congressional Quarterly, That
 
same CBO report also identifies the General Revenue Sharing and Title XX
 
Social Service Programs as entitlements, contrary to most of the other li
 
terature on entitlements.
 
This thesis tries to make sense out of what is essentially a hodge-podge.
 
There are certain basic programs which, the entire literature agrees are
 
entitlements: Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Railroad Retirement,
 
Guaranteed Student Loans, Veteran's Compensation, Military Retirement, etc.
 
There are also quite a few arguable programs, the majority of which have
 
already been mentioned above. This thesis, will rely on a critical review of
 
CBO and 0MB sources to arrive at a consistent and hopefully accurate list
 
.. 16
 
of current entitlement programs.
 
Beyond that identification of entitlements is the issue of congressional
 
control of entitlement spending within the present budgetary process. Con
 
trol, in this thesis, means Congress having the ability, under current law
 
and the structure of the budgetary process, to enact effective constraints
 
on the growth of federal spending for entitlements. The issue is not the
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growth of entitlement spending versus no growth of such spending; it is
 
the relatively unfettered, undisciplined growth versus controlled, ba
 
lanced growth of entitlement spending. The issue is congressional capa
 
city to increase or decrease entitlement spending as a budgetary outcome
 
associated with a deliberate plan of budgetary priorities.
 
Theoretically, Congress has the regular power and capacity to pass any
 
legislation it so desires concerning the budget, and to use any of a
 
variety of budgetary devices to keep programmatic spending within a dis
 
ciplined range and limitation. In fact, most critics, including the Reagan
 
administration, blame any dearth of congressional control of programmatic
 
spending on a simple congressional lack of will, not on structural in
 
capacity. However, once Congress accords programs the status of entitle
 
ments within the budgetary process, one practical result is that Congress
 
has also legislated itself a diminished power to constrain spending for
 
those programs. By its very nature within the present budgetary process,
 
entitlement spending becomes self-perpetuating and virtually automatic.
 
Entitlements enjoy a favored, protected status and their annual spending
 
totals are extremely difficult to predict. Of course. Congress can "merely"
 
strip an individual program of its entitlement status, as it did the Food
 
Stamp Program. However, that is not only a rare congressional action, it
 
also begs the question. Taking entitlement status from individual programs
 
avoids, rather than confronts squarely the issue of whether Congress can,
 
under current law and the present structure of the budgetary process, control
 
entitlement spending once programs are designated entitlements. In the last
 
few years it certainly has not done so, even when it has tried to, dis
 
crediting somewhat the view that the unfettered growth of entitlement
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spending has only been by deliberate design, rather than because of any
 
congressional loss of control. Again, this thesis argues that without
 
structural changes in the way entitlements now fit within the budgetary
 
process. Congress cannot control entitlement spending. It is more than
 
a lack of will—it is a lack of structural capacity.
 
CHAPTER II: AN OVERVIEW OE CURRENT ENTITLEMENTS
 
WHAT ARE ENTITLEMENTS AND HOW DO THEY WORK?
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A. What Are Entitlements Within The Budgetary Process?
 
Entitlements as income-transfer programs, obligate payments—cash or
 
in-kind—to beneficiaries who meet eligibility requirements established
 
by the authorizing legislation which creates the program. Persons become
 
'entitled' to program benefits when they apply and meet specified program
 
criteria such as an income level, age level, marital status, prior contri­
butions to a trust fund, etc.
 
The authorization process which creates each entitlement—and indeed
 
2
 
each congressionally established federal program —not only mandates eligi
 
bility rules and requirements for each entitlement, it also grants unlimited
 
(as needed) amounts of budget authority to the entitlement, effectively put
 
ting annual increases for entitlements on automatic pilot. In fact, annual
 
outlays for entitlements are automatically determined by the numbers of
 
eligible applicants and the current benefit levels mandated for the program,
 
rather than by the appropriations process. There are two principal variations
 
on this theme: indexed entitlements, whose estimated expenditure increases are
 
annually listed in the legislated appropriations acts as a matter of course
 
without congressional control of their funding levels (almost without exception
 
supported by trust fund revenues); and appropriated entitlements, whose estimated
 
expenditures must technically go through the regular appropriations committee
 
procedures and are thus theoretically subject to annual congressional control of
 
3
 
their level of funding (supported by general revenue sources). However, in
 
practice, because yearly costs for all of the entitlements are fundamentally
 
dependent on economic conditions (e.g., inflation, high unemployment, etc.), the
 
numbers of eligible beneficiaries, eligibility rules and any inherent re
 
strictions on benefit levels, the annual expenditure and outlay
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levels of both varieties of entitlements are determined by the authorizing
 
legislation, not the yearly appropriations procedures.^
 
The large income-transfer system which entitlements dominate consists
 
of two categories: social insurance programs and welfare. The social
 
insurance category represents the biggest share of income—transfer ex
 
penditures. In fact just one social insurance program—Social Security—
 
6
 
obligated more than 20% of the entire 1982 fiscal budget.
 
Social insurance programs allocate cash benefits to individuals
 
who have contributed to the support pool of those programs through specified
 
taxes or other devices, and who also are aged, retired, unemployed, or
 
disabled, with recipient wealth or income level being irrelevant to benefits.
 
The single largest social insurance program and entitlement is the Old
 
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Program (Social Security). The
 
other programs included in this category are Railroad Retirement, Civil
 
Service Retirement, other government retirement and pensions (e.g. Federal
 
Reserve Board Employees' Retirement, etc.), Federal/State Unemplo3mient
 
Insurance, Veterans' Compensation, disabled miners and coal-miners' benefits,
 
and Medicare. They are all entitlements.^
 
Welfare programs base benefit eligibility on needs analyses-low income
 
status, family composition, assets, etc.-rather than on any prior contributions
 
to a trust fund. Most of the government's income-transfer programs related
 
specifically to poverty are in this category, including the two largest ones.
 
Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid. The other
 
eight welfare programs are Supplementary Security Income, Veterans' Pensions,
 
Food Stamps, Child (and elderly) Nutrition programs. Low-income Housing
 
Assistance, Earned Income Tax Credit, General State/Meal Assistance to the
 
-10­
Needy, and the Emergency Assistance Program. All but the Low-income
 
8
 
Housing Assistance Program and Food Stamps are entitlements.
 
Table II-1 shows a summary listing of these entitlements and their
 
outlays from fiscal years 1972-1985 (estimates).
 
Other entitlement programs which do not really fit into either
 
the social insurance or welfare categories include the Guaranteed Student
 
Loan Program (Special Allowances), interest on the public debt. Farm Price
 
Support Loans (Rice, Honey, Tobacco, Upland Cotton, Wool, Mohair), Co
 
mmodity Export Suspension Protection and Grants to States for Social
 
9
 
Services. In all, there are approximately 35 inclusive federal entitle­
10 ,
 
ment program categories and 70 individual programs. The categories
 
are all listed in Table II-2.
 
B. How Do Entitlements Work?
 
Once established into law, each entitlement program inherits a specific
 
constitutency, including beneficiaries, employment-related implementers and
 
other advocates. Most entitlements also come into being with an indexation
 
or other cost-of-living adjustment device attached, which annually increases
 
the dollar amounts of benefits receivable in response to shifting economic
 
changes. This feature is discussed in a following section. It should be
 
noted here, however, that while retaining some positive advantages, this
 
indexation/COLA characteristic is one of the distinctive ingredients making
 
entitlement expenditures uncontrollable.
 
Each entitlement is administered directly by a federal agency, state
 
agency or a combination of the two. Social Security and the other trust
 
fund entitlements are generally administered by federal agencies, and the
 
means-tested entitlements are either direct federal administration (e.g.
 
TABLE II-l
 
FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR GENERAL' ENTITLEMENTS AS INCOME-TRANSFER PROGRAMS,
 
FISCAL YEAR 1972 - 1986 ; 
(In Billions of Dollars) 
Function and 
Subfunction 
Actual 
Estimate 
1973 1974 1975 1976 TqI 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1988 1984 1; 
Department of Defense-Military; 
Retired military personnel 4.4 7v3 1.9 8.2 9.2 10.3 11.9 13.7 15.0 16.5 17.7 1? 
Agriculture: 
Farm Income Stabilization 4.1 1.5 0.8 1.6 0-3 4.5 6.6 4.8 3.5 4.0 7.0 2.9 3.6 
.Income Security: 
General retirement & dis 
ability insurance 
Federal employee retirement 
and disability 
Unemployment compensation 
Housing assistance 
Food and nutrition assistance 
Other income security 
51.7 
4.5 
5.4 
1.6 
3.6 
6.2 
58.6 
5.6 
6.1 
1.8 
4.4 
7.9 
69.3 
7.0 
13.5 
2.1 
6.6 : 
10.1 
77.2 
8.2 
19.5 
2.5 
8.0 
12.2 
20.9 
2.3 
4.0 
0.7 
1.8 
3.1 
88.6 
9.5 
15.3 
3.0 
8.5 
13.0 
97.2 108.5 
10.7 12.4 
11.8 10.7 
3.7 '4.4 
8.9 10.8 
13.9 13.4 
123.7 
14.7 
18.0 
5.5 
14.0 
17.2 
145.0 
17.5 
19.7 
6.9 
16.2 
19.7 
162.3 
19.4 
25.2 
8.2 
15.6 
20.2 
175.7 
21.1 
22.6 
8.9 
13.8 
19.8 
190.6 
22.5 
19.8 
9.4 
14.0 
18.6 
20^ 
24 
18 
9 
14 
19 
Income security for veterans 
Health care services 
6.5 
14.6 
6.8 
17.3 
7.9 
22.3 
8.4 
27.5 
2.1 
7.2 
9.2 
32.3 
9.7 
36.7 
10.8 
42.5 
11.7 
50.1 
12.9 
60.4 
14.1 
68.0 
14.8 
72.7 
15.4 
79.6 
16 
88 
SOURCE: The U'3. Budget; in Brief, 1983j.Office of Management and Budget,
 
pp. 80-83. ^ ^
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TABLE II-2:INCLUSIVE CATEGORIES FOR CURRENT FEDERAL ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS
 
1. Federal Judiciary Survivors Benefits 14i General Revenue Sharing
 
2. U.S. Coast Guard Retirement Pay 15. Supplemental Security Income
 
3. Federal Employment Retirement and 16. Dept. of Defense-Military
 
Disability Programs Retired Pay and Benefits
 
(a). Civil Service Retirement
 17. Veterans' Pensions
 
(b). Federal Reserve Board
 18. 	 Price Support Loans for Rice,

Employees Retirement
 Honey, Tobacco, Upland.Cotton,
 
(c). CIA Retirement and Disability Wool, Mohair
 
(d). 	Foreign Service Retirement 19. Dairy Price Supports
 
and Disability
 20. 	 Medicare (Part A)
 
4. U.S. Presidents' Pensions
 21. 	 Medicare (Part B)
 
5. U.S. Public Health Service
 22. Medicaid
 
Commissioned Officers Retirement
 
23. 	 Special Milk Program
 
6. Federal Employment Compensation Act
 
24. 	 Food Donations-Elderly Feeding
 
7- Special Benefits for Disabled
 Programs
 
Coal Miners (HHS)
 
25. 	 Commodity Export Suspension Protection
 
8. Special Benefits for Disabled
 
Coal Miners (Dept. of Labor) 26. Deficiency and Disaster Payments for
 
Wheat, Rice, Feed grains. Cotton Price
 
9. Guaranteed Student Loan Program
 Programs

(Special Allowances)
 
27. 	 Grants to States for Social Services
 
10c	 Social Security: Federal Old Age
 
Survivors and Disability Insurance 28. Interest on the Public Debt
 
(OASDI)
 29. 	 Aid to Families With Dependent
 
11.	 Social Security: Disability and Children (AFDC)
 
Hospital Insurance
 30. 	 Earned Income Tax Credit
 
12.	 Child Nutrition Programs
 31. 	 Claims Against the Government
 
(a). 	National School Lunch
 
(Commodity Subsidy) 32. Forest Service Assistance
 
(b).	 National School Lunch 33. Subsidies to Bureau of Land
 
(Cash Subsidy) Management
 
(c).	 School Breakfast 34. Interest on Refunded Internal
 
(Cash Subsidy) Revenue Collections
 
(d).	 Summer Food Service 35. Internal Revenue Collections
 
(Cash Subsidy) and Interest for Puerto Rico
 
(e). Child Care Feeding
 
(Commodity Subsidy)
 
(f).	 Child Care Feeding
 
(Cash Subsidy)
 
13.	 Railroad Retirement
 
SOURCE: Compiled from CBO and 0MB lists contained in. Indexing With The Consumer
 
Price Index, 1981, pp. 23-30; Congressional Quarterly, 2/6/82, p. 193.
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Social Security) or the combination federal-state (e®g. AFDC, Medicaid),
 
Decreases in program funding thus will primarily impact the!federal
 
budget or will significantly affect both federal and state budgets.
 
This point is also discussed in the next chapter.
 
Payments are handled in a variety of ways. Medicare, which provides
 
health insurance for more than 20 million 65-and-over clients, plus
 
3 million disabled patients, utilizes federal reimbursements for in
 
dividual medical costs directly to the attending medical institution
 
or physicians' unit. Medicaid, financed by a state-federal matching
 
fund arrangement and aimed at low-income aged, blind and disabled
 
persons, utilizes state disbursal or medical payment stickers to
 
individuals, and reimbursements to nursing home and other institutional
 
12
 
facilities for services rendered. AFDC, TAA and UI send monthly cash
 
-(in the form of negotiable checks) to eligible individuals, and the
 
Food Stamps Program sends monthly food coupons. Farm price support
 
loans, commodity purchases and direct payments to farmers are handled
 
13
 
by the federal Commodity Credit Corporation.
 
The General Revenue Sharing Program and the Title XX Social
 
Services Program make direct grants to state and local government rather
 
than to individuals. Since 1981, the GRS grants have been mandated
 
directly to county, city and toxmship jurisdictions, and Title XX to
 
state-administered day care, handicapped, elderly, family planning and
 
other social services. Both programs allocate their funds based on an
 
area's per capita income, population demographics, tax factors, etc.
 
Both are also capped entitlements and thus their annual expenditure
 
14
 
increases are neither unbridled nor automatic.
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The Guaranteed Student Loan Program allocates educational loan
 
subsidies for students whose parents make $30,000 or less. Private lending
 
institutions grant the loans and advance the funds, with the federal
 
government guaranteeing repayment. The Child Nutrition Program annually
 
gives federal grants to school districts to provide subsidized lunches,
 
breakfasts and other food supplements to enrolled school children.
 
In summary, entitlement programs operate as consistent, entrenched
 
income-transfer devices. Once established, they assume a structural
 
existence very resistant to either dismantlement or more than cosmetic
 
adjustment. They become more or less "permanent" budgetary programs
 
which 	are guaranteed regular funding.
 
C. 	Entitlements and the Budgetary Process
 
Before the passage and implementation of the 1974 Budget and
 
Impoundment Act, entitlement spending went virtually unregulated.
 
Congressional entitling committees were "beneficiary-centered." Their
 
major purpose was the production of new entitlements and increasing
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benefits for existing ones. This privileged status within the
 
congressional budget process, pre—1974, caused entitlements to be the
 
"fastest-growing portion of the federal budget as well as the single
 
most important factor in the year-to-year rise in federal spending,"
 
in the decade prior to the implementation of the Budget Act.^^
 
Currently, that status remains under the new budgetary process,
 
although several Budget Act stipulations seek to terminate it, at least
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for new entitlements. Those stipulations are:
 
(a). Section 303, which prohibits either House or Senate
 
consideration during a fiscal year of new. revenue
 
-15­
bills, spending or entitlement legislation, etc.,
 
before congressional consideration and adoption of
 
the first budget resolution for the next fiscal year.
 
Advance revenue and appropriations bills which take
 
effect after the next fiscal year are exempted, but
 
advance entitlement authorization is not.
 
(b). 	Section 401 (a), which restricts new contract and
 
borrowing authority, and mandates that new entitlements
 
cannot become effective before the beginning of the
 
next fiscal year.
 
(c). 	Section 401 (b), which mandates the referral of new
 
entitlement authorizations exceeding an authorizing
 
committee's Section 302 budgetary allocation to the
 
Appropriations Committee.
 
Within the past and present budget processes, entitlements are a
 
part of the congressional backdoor spending practices. The other two
 
principal types are borrowing and contract authority. All three have long
 
enjoyed favored status with authorizing committees and others, since they
 
provide convenient access for bypassing the Appropriations Committees in
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getting programs funded. The main aim of the Budget Act stipulations
 
mentioned above is to subject all three types of backdoor spending pro
 
grams to the discipline of the budget process, and to remove them from
 
special budgetary treatment.' That aim, for the most part, has been
 
attained more with new contract and borrowing authority programs than
 
with new entitlements, although one major result of the Budget Act stip
 
ulations has been to make proposed new entitlements, theoretically,
 
compete more equally with other claims on the federal budget. The
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stipulations do not affect existing backdoor programs.
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Utilizing the authority of these stipulations, the Budget Committees
 
have used procedural points of order, plus the generation of negative
 
publicity concerning the immediate and future costs of newly proposed
 
entitlements, as weapons to hold down the growth of new entitlements.
 
The Appropriations Committees have depended on Section 401 (b), but in
 
effect have only been able to prevent the proliferation of small entitle
 
ments through such dependence. The Appropriations Committees have been
 
relatively ineffective in using 401 (b) to deal with the few large entitle­
21
 
ments proposed since 1975.
 
Through some combination of efforts by the Budget and Appropriations
 
Committees, and other political factors, very few new entitlements have
 
been created since the Budget Act's implementation. However, the real
 
growth in entitlement spending has been in the programs pre-dating the
 
Act's implementation and still currently viable, since the language of
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the law left them as they were before: virtually unregulated.
 
The extent of current major entitlements and their impact on the
 
federal budget may be gauged from Table II-3, which shows total outlay
 
expenditures for inclusive categories of major entitlement programs
 
for fiscal year 1982.
 
TABLE II-3
 
FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR CURRENT ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS,
 
FISCAL YEAR 1982
 
PROGRAM
 
Defense
 
Retired military personnel pay
 
Operations and maintenance, claims
 
Agriculture
 
Farm price supports
 
Transportation
 
Coast Guard retirement pay
 
Railroad litigation
 
Education, Training, Employment and Social Services
 
Student loan insurance
 
Social service grants
 
Health
 
Medinaid
 
Medicare supplementary insurance
 
Medicare hospital insurance
 
Income Security
 
Special benefits for disabled coal miners
 
Social Security old-age and survivors'
 
insurance
 
Social Security disability
 
Black lung disability
 
Railroad retirement
 
Federal employee retirement and disability
 
Unemployment compensation
 
Child nutrition ^
 
Supplemental Security Income
 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
 
Earned Income Tax Credit
 
Veterans
 
Compensation and benefits
 
Readjustment and education
 
TOTAL OUTLAYS
 
$ 15,037,341,000
 
155,477,000
 
11,140,436,000
 
288,000,000
 
552,000,000
 
3,067,500,000
 
2,720,000,000
 
17,874,000,000
 
15,456,000,000
 
33,420,000,000
 
1,094,765,000
 
136,252,304,000
 
18,762,000,000
 
744,777,000
 
5,289,000,000
 
20,272,676,000
 
23,661,672,000
 
120,016,000
 
7,983,330,000
 
8,072,698,000
 
1,252,000,000
 
14,260,300,000
 
2,045,200,000
 
TABLE II-3(Continued)
 
PROGRAM TOTAL OUTLAYS
 
General Government
 
Claims against the government 377,500,000
 
Fiscal Assistance
 
General revenue sharing 4,566,700,000
 
Forest service 231,841,000
 
Bureau of Land Management 645,800,000
 
Internal Revenue collections for Puerto Rico 245,000,000
 
Interest
 
Interest 	on the public debt 118,607,000,000
 
Interest on refunded Internal Revenue
 
Collections 1,450,000,000
 
* Entitlement status of some child nutrition programs in dispute.
 
SOURCE: 	Compiled by Congressional Quarterly from February 1, 1982,
 
data supplied by the Congressional Budget Office. Cited in.
 
The Congressional Quarterly, 2/6/82, p. 193.
 
CHAPTER III: THE NATURE OF ENTITLEMENT SPENDING WITHIN THE
 
BUDGETARY PROCESS—THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS IN
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Within the present budgetary process, there are three major
 
structural components associated with virtually all entitlements: in
 
dexation, program interaction and the number of beneficiaries. All
 
three^-singly and in combination—radically affect the annual increases
 
in entitlement spending. They are the three components most responsible
 
for the lack of congressional control over the relationship between entitle
 
ment spending and the budget.
 
A. Indexing for Inflation
 
Indexing is a legislated attempt to adjust automatically the
 
benefit- levels or eligibility criteria of a program, expressed in
 
current dollar terms, in order to neutralize the effects of a rise
 
in prices (or, what is the same thing, a steady fall in the dollar's
 
purchasing power).^ It is an attempt to preserve the real value
 
of program benefits to clients through escalators, cost—of-living
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adjustments, etc. Advantages of indexation include: (a)» elimin
 
ating the need for Congress to legislate adjustments in certain pro
 
grams annually or on an ad hoc basis which would unnecessarily risk
 
re-opening debate on the entirety of the program involved; (b).
 
reducing client uncertainty regarding future benefit levels; and
 
(c). decreasing the threat of election-year benefit increases for
 
political purposes.^
 
Major disadvantages of indexation include: (a), the increase
 
in the share of the U.S. budget that is essentially on 'automatic
 
pilot', making it much more difficult to reduce or control federal
 
spending; (b). the inequity inherent in providing some beneficiaries
 
the relative ability to keep up with inflation while wage earners have
 
to fend for themselves and are victimized by inflation; and (c). the
 
increased uncertainty because much of the budget is effectively controlled
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by economic conditions which are very difficult to predict.
 
The major provisions indexed in federal programs are benefit levels,
 
eligibility criteria, ceilings or floors on benefits payable and formulas
 
for agricultural parity. The indexation of the benefit level is the most
 
common form of indexing, calling for a proportionate increase in the levels
 
of benefits payable with changes in the specific indexing measure. The
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Consumer Price Index is the most popular index presently used.
 
By contrast, the indexing of eligibility criteria is principally uti
 
lized for programs aimed at the economically disadvantaged. Changing price
 
levels inevitably affect the meaning and significance of both the federally
 
defined poverty level, and simultaneously a designated income eligibility
 
standard. Thus such price changes necessitate at least a periodic adjust
 
ment of eligibility criteria and, consequently, the number of program
 
participants. While justly criticized for not accurately representing the
 
consumption habits of the economically disadvantaged, the CPI remains the
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regular measurement used to adjust eligibility criteria.
 
Ceilings indexation is most characteristic of programs like Medicaid
 
and Medicare to prevent or reduce excessive claims for payments. It often
 
has the reverse effect, however, since there is little incentive for
 
health care providers to hold down medical costs in any case. Con
 
sequently any indexation simply helps motivate the long-time trend of
 
skyrocketing health care costs as a function of the health care market.
 
with the cap on claims reimbursements rising simultaneously with the
 
increase in costs(and costs are directly affected by their fees),^
 
The agricultural parity formula is an indexation of the relative
 
prices of farm goods bought by farmers compared to the prices of
 
goods they sell. It is utilized to determine the annual degree of
 
federal support for farm incomes, but has been criticized both for
 
being anachronistic and self-perpetuating. Its pricing reference
 
base, for example, is still 1910-1914, and both production techniques
 
and consumption habits, among other things, have substantially
 
changed since then. It also contains a feedback component that
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consistently inflates agricultural prices.
 
By fiscal 1982, at least 1/3 of federal expenditures were
 
directly tied to either the Consumer Price Index or other adjusters,
 
and over 50% of the entire budget was tied to some form of direct or
 
indirect indexation. From 1966-1980, the quantity of federal pro
 
grams containing some form of direct indexation grew from 17 to 90.
 
The impact of this tendency is reflected in the fact that even a 1%
 
increase in the CPI will automatically result in over $2 billion
 
dollars of additional, required government spending, based on 1981­
9
 
1982 current dollar values.
 
What Government Programs are Indexed?
 
The first major federal program to be directly and officially
 
tied to a price index was the Civil Service Retirement System in 1962.
 
Indexing was accomplished as a viable, efficient alternative to the pre
 
vious chore of laboriously repeating one-time adjustments in retirement
 
benefits as the cost of living changed. This federal indexation es
 
tablished a strong precedent which was followed up in 1971 with the
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indexation of the Food Stamp Program, and in 1972 with the indexation
 
of the Social Security System, which is today the largest of all federally
 
indexed programs. There was a precipitous spurt of program indexations
 
after that date, resulting in at least 90 currently indexed federal
 
programs. They can be divided into indexed entitlements, indexed ap
 
propriations, and quasi-indexed programs. Indexed entitlements and
 
appropriations have their benefit levels indexed (although appropriations
 
remain affected also by the discretionary congressional review process).
 
Quasi-indexed programs either have their indexed provisions as a ceiling
 
or floor on program benefits payable, their indexed provisions not
 
being operative under certain conditions, or have components other
 
than benefits indexed (e.g., eligibility criteria). An example of a
 
quasi-indexed program is CETA.^^ Tables III-l and III-2 show indexed entitle
 
ments, indexed appropriations and quasi-indexed entitlements and
 
appropriations.
 
The Impact of Indexation
 
The general consequences of indexation depend upon both the type
 
of price change occurring in the economy and the kind of measurement
 
used to analyze that change. On the one hand, for example, when price
 
increases are across-the-board indexation can rectify or stabilize
 
loss of relative income parity by those on fixed or marginal incomes,
 
in effect reestablishing the status quo, and "preserving the initial
 
12
 
income distribution." Indexation associated with across-the-board
 
price increases does not cause the percentage rates of government
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spending to rise as a share of GNP. On the other hand, indexation of
 
a relative price change causes income imbalance and redistribution. This
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TABLE III-l. INDEXED ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS
 
PROGRAM DATE OF INDEXATION
 
ESTIMATED 1981
 
OUTLAYS(IN BILLIONS)
 
1. Federal Judiciary Survivors Benefits
 
2. U.S. Coast Guard Retirement Pay
 
3. Civil Service Retirement System
 
4. Military Retired Pay
 
5. U.S. Presidents' Pensions
 
6. Public Healtb Service Commis
 
sioned Officers Retirement
 
7. Federal Reserve Board Employees
 
Retirement
 
8. CIA Retirement and Disability
 
System
 
9. Federal Employment Compensation Act
 
10. Special Benefits for Disabled
 
Coal Miners (HHS)
 
11. Guaranteed Student Loan Program
 
(Special Allowances)
 
12. Federal Old Age,Survivors and
 
Disability Insurance (OASDI)
 
13. Child Nutrition Programs
 
National School Lunch Program
 
(Commodity Subsidy)
 
National School Lunch Program
 
(Cash Subsidy)
 
School Breakfast Program
 
(Cash Subsidy)
 
Summer Food Service
 
(Cash Subsidy)
 
Child Care Feeding
 
(Commodity Subsidy)
 
Child Care Feeding
 
(Cash Subsidy)
 
1956
 
1958
 
1962
 
1963
 
1963
 
(effective 1964)
 
1965
 
1965
 
1964
 
(effective 1966)
 
1966
 
1969
 
1976
 
1972
 
(effective 1975)
 
Benefits:
 
1973, 1975,1978
 
Eligibility:
 
1971, 1977
 
0.002
 
0.232
 
17.326
 
13.781
 
0.0002
 
0.077
 
0.004
 
Classified
 
0.376
 
1.057
 
0.401
 
140.117
 
3.790
 
TABLE III-l (continued)
 
ESTIMATED 1981
 
PROGRAM DATE OF INDEXATION OUTLAYS(IN BILLIONS)
 
14. 	Special Benefits for Disabled 1974 0.922
 
Coal Miners (DOL)
 
15. Railroad Retirement Benefits 1974
 
(effective 1975) 5.296
 
16. Supplemental Security Income 1974 7.438
 
(effective 1975)
 
17. Foreign Service Retirement and 1976 0.174
 
Disability Fund
 
18. Department of Defense: 1972, 1974, 1978 0.322
 
Survivor Benefit Plan
 
Retired Serviceman's Family
 
Protection Plan—Guaranteed Minimum
 
3.844
19. Veterans' Pensions	 1979
 
TOTAL OUTLAYS 195.159
 
SOURCE: Indexing With the Consumer Price Index: Problems and Alternatives,
 
Congreesional Budget Office (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
 
Printer, 1981), pp. 23-30.
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TABLE III-2. INDEXED PROGRAMS OTHER THAN ENTITLEMENTS, AND QUASI-INDEXED
 
PROGRAMS 
ESTIMATED 1981 
PROGRAM CLASSIFICATION DATE OF INDEXATION OUTLAYS (BILLIONS) 
Price Support Loans Quasi-Indexed 
Rice Entitlement 
Honey 
Tobacco 
Upland Cotton 
Wool 
Mohair 
2. Dairy Price Supports Quasi-Indexed
 
Entitlement
 
3. Medicare (Part A) Quasi-Indexed
 
Entitlement
 
4. Medicare (Part B) Quasi-Indexed
 
Entitlement
 
5. Medicaid Quasi~Indexed 

Entitlement
 
6. Special Milk Program Quasi-Indexed
 
Entitlement
 
7. Food Donations for the Quasi-Indexed
 
Elderly Feeding Program Entitlement
 
Commodity Export Sus Quasi-Indexed
 
pension Protection Entitlement
 
Deficiency and Dis Quasi-Indexed
 
aster Payments (Target Entitlement
 
Price Programs):
 
Wheat
 
Feedgrains
 
Cotton
 
Rice
 
10. Grants to States for Quasi-Indexed
 
Social Services Entitlement
 
11. Overseas Station
 
Allowances (State Dep.) Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
12. Overseas Station Quasi-Indexed
 
Allowances (Defense Appropriation
 
Dep.)
 
1949,1954,
 
1977,1978
 
1949
 
1965
 
(effective 1966)
 
1972
 
(effective 1973)
 
1974
 
Benefits:1974
 
Eligibility:1973
 
1975
 
1977
 
1979
 
1979
 
1949
 
1949
 
0.068
 
0.925
 
27.625
 
12.650
 
16.026
 
0.163
 
0.085
 
0.0
 
0.753
 
3.283
 
0.011
 
0.486
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TABLE III-2 (continued) 
ESTIMATED 1981 
PROGRAM CLASSIFICATION DATE OF INDEXATION OUTLAYS (BILLIONS) 
13. 0PM Cost-of-Llving
 
Allowance Program
 
1^. Dep. of Interior
 
Water and Power
 
Resources Service
 
Construction Program
 
15. Military Barracks and
 
Officer Quarters Con
 
struction Program
 
16. Military Pay
 
17. Federal Civilian
 
Pay (General
 
Schedule)
 
18. Federal Civilian
 
Pay (Blue Collar)
 
19. Food Stamp Program
 
20. Legal Services
 
21. Community Services
 
Administration,
 
Community Action
 
Operations:
 
Local Initiative
 
Senior Opportunities
 
State Economic Oppor
 
tunity
 
Community Food and
 
Nutrition
 
Energy Conservation
 
Services
 
Youth Sports Program
 
Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
Quasi-Indexed
 
Appropriation
 
1949
 
1954
 
1968
 
1968
 
1970
 
(effective 1971)
 
1968
 
(effective 1972)
 
1971
 
1972
 
1972
 
0.120
 
0.590
 
0.228
 
33.588
 
38.969
 
10.368
 
10.954
 
0.317
 
0.488
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TABLE III-2 (continued) 
ESTIMATED 1981 
PROGRAM CLASSIFICATION DATE OF INDEXATION OUTLAYS (BILLIONS) 
22. Health Scholarships: Indexed 1976 0.038 
National Health Appropriation 
Service Corps 
Scholarships 
Indian Health 
Scholarships 
23. Foster Grandparents Quasi-Indexed 
Appropriation 
1973 
(effective 1974) 
0.048 
24. Senior Companions Quasi-Indexed 1973 0.013 
Appropriations (effective 1974) 
25. Basic Education Indexed 1974 2.353 
Opportunity Grants Appropriation 
26. Supplemental Educa 
tion Opportunity 
Grants 
Indexed 
Appropriation 
1974 0.370 
27. Senior Community 
Service Employment 
and Training Service 
Quasi-Indexed 
Appropriation 
1974 0.265 
28. Lower Income Housing Indexed 
Assistance (Section 8) Appropriation 
1974 3.070 
29. Community Services 
Administration Energy 
Crisis Intervention 
Service 
Quasi-Indexed 
Appropriation 
1975 (Transferred 
to another program) 
Quasi-Indexed30. Territorial and 
International Affairs— Appropriation 
Grants for the Northern 
Mariana Islands 
1976 0.024 
31. Head Start Quasi-Indexed 
Appropriation 
1976 0.870 
0.044
32. Follow Through Quasi-Indexed 1976
 
Appropriation
 
TABLE III-2 (continued)
 
ESTIMATED 1981
 
PROGRAM CLASSIFICATION DATE OF INDEXATION OUTLAYS (BILLIONS)
 
33. Special Supplemental Quasi-Indexed 1978
 0.862
 
Food Program for Appropriation (effective 1979)
 
Women, Infants, and
 
Children (WIC)
 
34. National Direct Quasi-Indexed 1980 0.201
 
Student Loans Appropriation
 
SOURCE: Ibid, pp.23-30.
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is based on the fact that a real reduction in productive output-supply
 
is more often the cause of relative price changes, and the indexation
 
aimed at restoring the purchasing power lost through the price change
 
will not also restore the lack of supply. Consumers and beneficiaries
 
will not have the same capacity to purchase the same amount of goods
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and services as before the shift in prices. Indexation associated with
 
relative price changes thus usually pressures increased government
 
spending in income transfer programs since it will affect both benefit
 
levels and eligibility through its impact on relative parity. The auto
 
matic $2 billion dollar approximate increase in government spending re
 
sulting from a 1% change in the CPI, as mentioned earlier, could actually
 
be much more than that if indexed benefits rise faster than the bene
 
ficiaries' other income and thus cause a precipitous rise in program
 
participation.^^ In other words, there will be more program participa
 
tions once potential beneficiaries realize there is a strategic im
 
balance between specific program benefits and the other income available
 
to them.
 
B. Program Interaction
 
Currently, approximately one-half of the U.S. budget is authorized
 
for program expenditures providing benefits to individuals—entitlements
 
and programs which operate like entitlements. Simultaneously, at least,
 
one-half of all American households currently receive benefits from one
 
or more of these income transfer programs, and over one-half of those
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beneficiaries receive assistance from two or more of these programs.
 
This multiple participation occurs because several federal programs are
 
aimed at serving different needs of people who live in similar social
 
conditions. In addition, benefits assistance from one program frequently
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depends on or is associated with some level of benefits from another
 
program. Program interaction is the combination of multiple partici
 
pations such that the beneficiaries of one program also receive assi
 
stance from another, and the receipt of the second benefits is depen
 
dent on the eligibility to receive the first. The extent of program
 
interaction depends on the benefit formulas, eligibility rules and
 
specific regulations of programs involved. Eligibility for Medicaid,
 
for example, automatically comes with eligibility for AFDC and, for
 
the most part, SSI. AFDC cash benefits are used to measure income for
 
food stamp eligibility; consequently reductions in AFDC benefits would
 
be compensated for, to some degree, by an increase in food stamp bene
 
fits and beneficiaries.^^
 
Generally, needs-based or means-tested programs have a higher proba
 
bility of interacting with both Other means-tested programs and the
 
social insurance programs, than the latter do with other programs. These
 
interactions are most usually directed one way: the means-tested programs
 
being affected by changes in the nonmeans-tested programs (and each other),
 
but not the reverse. Changing AFDC benefits then would not be expected to
 
change Social Security benefits more than marginally, yet Ghanging/reducing
 
Social Security benefits would be expected to seriously affect AFDC bene
 
fit levels.
 
While comprehensive studies identifying all of the income transfer
 
program interactions have not yet been done, it is definitely known that
 
AFDC, Social Security (including Railroad Retirement) and Unemployment
 
Insurance are all intimately connected with one or more of these pro­
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grams: Supplemental Security Income, Food Stamps, school lunch, housing
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assistance, Medicare and Medicaid. This phenomenon creates the
 
probability of significantly large secondary effects on the budget,
 
and seriously complicates accomplishing real reductions in budgetary
 
spending.
 
Of the 9 programs listed above, Medicaid, Food Stamps, free/
 
reduced price school lunches and subsidized housing assistance use
 
AFDC benefits/eligibility to set their assistance levels (Medicaid
 
through an eligibility linkage, the other three through income linkages).
 
Changes in AFDC eligibility requirements and/or benefit levels would
 
directly affect government spending in all four programs, but by
 
very different degrees (See TableIII-3). The categorical eligibility
 
link between AFDC and Medicaid (households eligible for AFDC are
 
automatically eligible for Medicaid) means that gains or losses in
 
AFDC eligibility would also translate into eligibility gains or losses
 
for Medicaid recipients, even though the amount of AFDC benefits has
 
virtually no effect on the amount of Medicaid benefits. By comparison,
 
most AFDC households are also automatically eligible for Food Stamps
 
(only about 75% actually apply for them), and thus changing AFDC elig
 
ibility will of necessity affect Food Stamp benefits. Moreover,
 
the benefit levels of AFDC recipients reciprocally affects the benefit
 
levels for Food Stamps, such that the higher the AFDC benefits, the less
 
the Food Stamp benefits allocated, and vice versa. A reduction in
 
AFDC benefits for those on just these two programs, would be balanced
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by at least a 32% increase in Food Stamp outlays.
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TABLE III-3
 
PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM AFDC^
 
THAT 	PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAMS THAT INTERACT WITH AFDC
 
Programs that Interact with Percent of AFDC Households Receiving
 
AFDC Benefits from these Programs^
 
Medicaid	 100^
 
Food 	Stamps ., 75
 
Free 	or Reduced-Price Lunch^ '55
 
Housing Assistance Programs
e	 
19
 
SOURCES: 	CBO estimates from March 1981 Current Population Survey (CPS) and
 
program data. See, Interactions Among Programs Providing Benefits
 
to Individuals, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, 1982, p. 8.
 
a. 	 Aid to Families with Dependent Children
 
b. 	 Percentages cannot be added but must be considered separately.
 
c. 	 All AFDC recipients are covered by Medicaid, but not all actually
 
receive medical benefits.
 
d. 	 One or more children in the household regularly eat a free or
 
reduced-price school lunch subsidized by the National School
 
Lunch Program.
 
e. 	 Household lives in a housing unit owned by a public agency or
 
pays reduced rent subsidized through existing housing programs
 
of the Housing Act of 1937 (P.L. 75-412), as amended.
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Regarding free or reduced-^price school lunches(a program in which
 
there is a low income threshold for reduced price lunches, a lower one
 
for free lunches and little, if any, other variation in benefits)the
 
changes in AFDC benefit levels would not necessitate shifts in the
 
school lunch program eligibility. That eligibility is dependent only
 
on incomes below 13% of the poverty line and AFDC benefit levels would
 
not increase drastically enough to raise the income levels to that cutoff.
 
Even though approximately 55% of AFDC families have children on the
 
school lunch program there is no high interaction between them in terms
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of benefits changes.
 
The opposite is true of AFDC households also on rent or housing
 
subsidies. Changes in AFDC benefit levels would directly affect their
 
income-determined housing payments: an increase in AFDC benefits will
 
mean some slight increase (depending on the formula used) in rent/
 
housing payments; and a decrease in AFDC benefits, means a reduction
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in the rent/housing fees (generally about 25-30%).
 
Medicare, Medicaid, SSI, Food Stamps and the housing assistance
 
programs all interact with or are associated through eligibility with
 
Social Security. Over 80% of Social Security beneficiaries (including
 
Railroad Retirement) are also on Medicare, 15% on Medicaid, 9% on SSI,
 
8% on food stamps and 5% in subsidized housing/rental assistance (See Table
 
III - A). Changes in Social Security eligibility would affect Medicare
 
eligibility, but the benefit levels of Medicare are not dependent on the
 
benefit levels for Social Security. As for Medicaid, Social Security
 
beneficiaries also participating in it are eligible through income and/
 
or SSI participation. Reductions in Social Security benefits can directly
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TABLE III-4: 	PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM SOCIAL
 
SECURITY^ THAT PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAMS THAT INTERACT
 
WITH SOCIAL SECURITY
 
Programs that Interact with Percent of Social Security House
 
Social Security and Patterns holds receiving Benefits from
 
of Benefits these programs^
 
Medicare	 83
 
Medicaid	 15
 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)	 9
 
Food 	Stamps
 
Social Security and Food Stamps only or with
 
programs other than SSI and AFDC^
 
Social Security, Food Stamps, either SSI or
 
AFDC, and possibly other programs 5
 
TOTAL Food Stamps	 T"
 
Housing Assistance Programs
 
Social Security and Housing Assistance only or
 
with programs other than SSI and AFDC^
 
Social Security, Housing Assistance, either SSI
 
or AFDC, and possibly other programs 1
 
TOTAL Housing Assistance T
 
SOURCES: CBO estimates from March 1981 Current Population Survey
 
(CPS) and program data. See Interactions, op. cit., p. 11.
 
The term Social Security is used here to include both Old Age,
 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance OASDI) and Railroad Retirement Programs.
 
Percentages cannot be added, but must be considered separately.
 
With this .pattern of program participation, if the household also
 
received SSI or AFDC benefits, these would offset virtually all
 
changes in Social Security benefits.
 
d.	 Household lives in public housing or pays reduced rent subsidized
 
by the existing housing programs of the Housing Act of 1937, as amended.
 
 affect Medicaid eligibility by causing an income reduction sufficient 
' ■ 23 
to qualify one for SSI and Medicaid.
 
SSI has a dollar for dollar compensation link with reduced benefits
 
for Social Security. I^at keeps this interaction from being a perfect
 
one-on-one offset is the 9% Social Security-SSI participation correspondence,
 
and the reciprocal fact that only about 50% of SSI beneficiaries are also
 
on Social Security. This low percentage correspondence also affects the
 
Food Stamp interaction. Approximately 12% of Social Security beneficiaries
 
are eligible, 8% apply-receive, and only 3% are on Social Security-Food
 
Stamps alone (as opposed to some combination with SSI and AFDC). Re
 
ductions in Social Security benefit levels within this 3% would be
 
offset by approximately 20% increases in Food Stamp allocations. For
 
the 5% of Social Security participants also on Food Stamps, AFDC and/
 
or SSI, any changes in Social Security benefits will be entirely made
 
up by the cash transfer programs (SSI, AFDC), and Food Stamp allocation
 
will be unchanged.
 
Interactions with the Housing Assistance programs would affect
 
only 5% of the Social Security beneficiaries. The ones not also on
 
SSI/AFDC would receive compensatory rent/housing payment decreases with
 
reduction in income from Social Security benefits, and the ones on
 
SSI/AFDC would have those programs affect any cash reductions resulting
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from Social Security benefits decreases.
 
This interactive relationship is similar to that of the approx
 
imately 12% of the unemployed insurance recipients who also participate
 
in the Food Stamp program, and the 10% participating in the free/reduced
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lunch program. Only 9% of those Food Stamps-UI beneficiaries (9% of the
 
12%) would have reduced UI benefits offset by an increased Food Stamps
 
allocation. The other 3% are Food Stamps-SSI-AFDC combinations and
 
reduced UI benefits would be compensated for by increased cash assistance
 
O^
 
from SSI or AFDC- (See Table III-5)c
 
Unemployment insurance benefits also interact with the school lunch
 
program, but to a very small degree. Only about 1/10 of the UI recipients
 
are also participants in the lunch program. Shifts in UI benefit levels
 
would only affect those school lunch beneficiaries close to the income
 
cutoff threshold (130% for free lunches, 185% of the poverty line for
 
reduced price lunches), and the price category for school lunches is
 
set at the beginning of the school year, only haphazardly matching UI
 
benefit periods.
 
Interaction and Government Spending
 
The CBO report mentioned above analyzed the overall effect of
 
interactions on the federal budget by using three measures; a hypothetical
 
20% spending cut in AFDC, Social Security, and Unemployment Insurance
 
by an across-the-board cut and an eligibility restriction. The results
 
were varied, showing offsetting program increases which significantly
 
altered the intent of the 20% cut (reducing it to a 9% cut in effect) and
 
other interactions which made no alterations at all of that intent.
 
Moreover, there was considerable variation between fedetal and state
 
spendings/savings reductions based on the 20% cut intended: states
 
received reduced savings in some instances and significant spending in
 
28
 
creases in others; the federal government did likewise.
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TABLE III-5: 	 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
 
THAT PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAMS THAT INTERACT WITH UNEMPLOY
 
MENT INSURANCE
 
Percent of Unemployment Insurance
Programs that Interact with
 
Households Receiving Benefits from
Unemployment Insurance and
 
Patterns of Benefits Other Programs^
 
Food 	Stamps
 
Unemplo3niient Insurance and Food
 
Stamps only or with programs other
 
than SSI and AFDC
 
Unemployment Insurance, Food Stamps,
 
either SSI or AFDC, and possibly other 1-3
 
programs
 
10-12
TOTAL Food Stamps
 
10
Free 	or Reduced-Price School Lunch^
 
SOURCES: CBO estimates from March 1981 Current Population Survey (CPS)
 
and program data^ See Interactions, op. cit., pp,. 12-13.
 
a. 	 Percentages cannot be added, but must be considered separately.
 
b. 	 One or more children in the household regularly eat a free or
 
reduced—price school lunch subsidized by the National School
 
Lunch Program.
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The across-the-board cut in AFDC benefits triggered the largest
 
amount of offsetting increases in interacted programs, thus insulating
 
AFDC recipients from an income reduction. Instead of the 20% cut
 
intended in government spending, CBO estimated the combined effect on
 
federal-state-local government at 14% reduced Spending, with state and
 
local government getting the full 20% in spending savings, and the 
. 29 : " ■ 
federal government only 9% in reduced outlays. This is because 
of the way program costs are shared by the different units of govern
 
ment. The federal government, for instance, is responsible for the
 
full costs of Food Stamps and Housing Assistance, the major offsetting
 
programs for AFDC. 55% of each dollar cut from AFDC would be compensated
 
for by an increased federal spending elsewhere. (See Table I1I-6.) Food
 
Stamp offsets would be approximately 24% of each dollar cut from AFDC,
 
with housing assistance accounting for 6% in reduced rent/housing fees.
 
Medicaid and the school lunch program benefits would not be affected
 
at all. There would be little or no interactive results due to the non-

correlation between the level of AFDC and Medicaid benefits (although
 
all AFDC eligibles are categorically eligible for Medicaid) and the low­
30
 
income circumstances of the school lunch program. In fact, the across­
the-board cut in Social Security, AFDC and UI benefits in general did not
 
cause any significant interactions in the programs using categorical
 
eligibility (Medicaid, Medicare) for one program as the criteria for
 
benefits eligibility for the other.
 
In addition, although the needs-based (i.e., means-tested) programs
 
(e.g., AFDC, Food Stamps) generally showed interactive results, not all
 
of them did (e.g., school lunch), and virtually none of the nonmeans-tested
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TABLE III-6
 
ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN AFDC^ BENEFITS
 
IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, BY-INTERACTING PROGRAM
 
Interacting Increase in Offset to Net cut as 
Program Interacting Each Dollar Percent of 
Program*s Cut in AFDC Previous AFDC 
Outlays . (In Cents) Outlays, Including 
(In Percents) Offsets 
20
0
Medicaid 0
 
Food 	Stamps 6 24 15
 
Free 	or Reduced- 0 20
 
Price Lunch
 
Housing
 
Assistance
 
Programs	 19
 
Overall Effects, All
 
Levels of Government^ 30 14
 
Effect on federal budget 55 9
 
Effect on state and local
 
20
budgets	 0^
 
SOURCE: CBO estimates in Interactions, op. cit., p- 18.
 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
a.
 
b.	 National School Lunch Program providing free or reduced-price
 
school lunch.
 
Household lives in public housing or pays reduced rent subsidized
 
by housing assistance programs.
 
d.	 The effects on different levels of government are not additive, but
 
must be computed separately.
 
Since the federal government pays for food stamps and housing
 
assistance, increased outlays for these programs would not
 
affect state and local budgets.
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(social insurance) programs demonstrated any percentage-significant
 
interaction/program offsets. Social Security recipients, for instance,
 
most of whom do not participate much in other programs (only 16% do),
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would receive program offsets that are, percentage-wise, quite small.
 
A 20% across-the-board cut in Social Security would, when adjusted for
 
offsets in SSI benefits (approximately 6% of every dollar cut). Food
 
Stamps and housing assistance (17% of each dollar per program), result
 
in an 18% cut in government spending for Social Security (See Table III-7).
 
It would also increase spending for SSI by approximately 20%, for Food
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Stamps by approximately 2%, and 3% for housing assistance. State
 
spending, since the states pay part of SSI costs, would increase 20%
 
for that program.
 
For UI, a 20% across-the-board cut would not be significantly offset,
 
since there are very few UI beneficiaries participating in other income
 
transfer programs. The principal compensatory offset would be Food Stamps,
 
which would increase its outlays by only 1%, each UI dollar decrease being
 
met by an average 32 cents in increased Food Stamps for the 6-9% of UI
 
beneficiaries also participating in the Food Stamp program. The other
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91-94% of UI recipients would receive the full 20% benefits reduction.
 
(See Table III-8 .)
 
The 20% eligibility restriction (lowering the income limit for AFDC,
 
and raising the Social Security retirement ages for full and early benefits,
 
or increasing the UI waiting period from 2 weeks to 3 or 4, etc.) would
 
cause means-tested and nonmeans-tested program interactions. For Food
 
Stamp recipients, for instance, loss of companion AFDC, Social Security
 
or other such benefits acts only as another income reduction, leading to
 
32 
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TABLE 1,11-7: 	ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN
 
SOCIAL SECURITYa BENEFITS IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, BY
 
INTERACTING PROGRAM
 
Interacting Increase in Offset to Net Cut as Percent 
Program Interacting Each Dollar of Previous 
Program's Cut in Social Social Security 
Outlays Security Outlays, Including 
(In Percents) (In Cents) Offsets 
0	 20
Medicare 0
 
0	 20
Medicaid 0
 
Supplemental
 
Security 20 19
 
Income (SSI)
 
20^
Food Stamps
 
Housing
 
Assistance
 20b
 
Programs^
 
Overall Effects,
 
Levels of Government
 8	 18.
 
Effect on federal budget 7 19
 
Effect on state and
 
local budgets
 
SOURCE: CBO 	estimates. See Interactions, op. cit., p. 20.
 
a. 	The term Social Security is used here to include both Old Age, Survivors,
 
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Railroad Retirement Programs.
 
b. 	The Offsets are small enough that the net cut rounds to 20 percent.
 
c. 	Household lives in public housing or pays reduced rent subsidized
 
by housing assistance programs.
 
d. 	The effects on different levels of government are not additive, but
 
must be computed separately.
 
e. 	State spending would increase, not decrease. State SSI benefit
 
costs would rise by about 0.3 percent of the amount of Social
 
Security outlays saved, but states would not receive any of the
 
savings in Social Security costs.
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TABLE III-8: ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN
 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, BY INTERACTING
 
PROGRAM
 
Interacting Increase in Offset to Net Cut as Percent 
Program Interacting Each Dollar of Previous Unemploy 
Program's cut in ment Insurance Outlays, 
Outlays Unemployment Including Offsets 
(In Percents) Insurance 
(In Cents) 
Food 	Stamps 1 19
 
Free 	or Reduced­
0	 20
 
Price Lunch^
 
Overall Effects, All
 
3	 19
Levels of Government^
 
Effect on federal budget 3 19
 
Effect on state and
 
local budgets 0
 
SOURCE: CBO estimates. See Interactions, op.cit., p. 26,
 
a. 	 National School Lunch Program providing free or reduced-price
 
school lunch.
 
\
 
b. 	 The effects on different levels of government are not additive,
 
but must be considered separately.
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increased Food Stamp benefits. But for the categorical eligibility
 
programs, loss of participation in one program also means loss of
 
participation in the second, thus producing double government spending
 
savings.
 
For AFDC, an eligibility restriction would cause this double
 
elimination, resulting in approximately 22% reductions (combined
 
federal, state, local) from the original 20%. Reductions in the
 
companion Medicaid program would be larger than the Food Stamps and
 
housing assistance offsets, producing the larger 22% reduction. In
 
the states alone, that figure would rise to 23%, and they would not
 
be responsible for any of the offset increases in Food Stamps and
 
t. . .. 35
 
housing assistance.
 
For Social Security eligibility, interactions with Medicare, SSI
 
and Medicaid—the former causing additional reductions, the latter
 
two causing additional spending—would produce a 19% reduction from the
 
original 20%. The federal government would gain from the double re
 
duction of Medicare and Social Security, but also pay most of the
 
increased Medicaid—SSI spending, while states would not gain anything
 
from the lowered Social Security-Medicare benefits, but would still
 
have to pay part of the increased SSI-Medicaid tax. SSI spending
 
would increase by 20%, Medicaid by 1%, Food Stamps by 2%, housing
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assistance by 3%, and Medicare spending reduced by 4%. (See Table III-9.)
 
For UI, only Food Stamps would significantly interact with a 20%
 
eligibility reduction, due again to the small participation of UI
 
recipients in other income transfer programs. Federal Food Stamps
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TABLE 111-9:	BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF CHANGING ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
 
TO ACHIEVE A 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN SOCIAL SECURITY^
 
OUTLAYS IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, BY INTERACTING PROGRAM
 
Interacting Increase in Offset to Net Cut as Percent 
Program Interacting Each Dollar of Previous Social 
Program's Cut in Social Security Outlays, 
Outlays Security Including Offsets 
(In Percents) (In Cents) 
21
Medicare -4 '
'	 -7
 
: ,1	 20^
Medicaid 1
 
Supplemental
 
Security 6
 19
20
 
Income (SSI)
 
20b
Food Stamps 2	 1
 
Housing Assistance
 
20b
Programsc 3	 1
 
Overall Effects, All
 
Levels of Government^ 2
 
20^
Effect on federal budget 1
 
Effect on state and
 
local budgets
 
SOURCE: CBO estimates^ See Interactions, PP- cit., p. 28.
 
a. 	The term Social Security is used here to include both Old Age,
 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Railroad Retirment
 
Programs.
 
b. 	The offsets are small enough that the net cut rounds to 20 percent,
 
c. 	Household lives in public housing or pays reduced rent subsidized
 
by housing assistance programs.
 
d. 	The effects on different levels of government are not additive,
 
but must be computed separately.
 
e. 	State spending would increase for Medicaid and SSI, but states
 
would riot obtain any of the savings in Social Security.
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outlays would increase 3% for every dollar of UI reduction from eligi­
■ 37 
bility restrictions, with state expenditures not affected either way,
 
(See Table III-IO.)
 
In summary, attempting to control entitlement programs primarily
 
through cuts in program funding authorizations and outlays is not a
 
simple affair. There are few, if any, 'pure' cuts because of the inter­
connectedness of both means-tested and trust-fund based programs. Be
 
cause of program interaction, intervening factors will continue to make
 
it extremely difficult to predict with any accuracy the full effect of
 
any single funding cut in entitlement programs. Additionally, while
 
indexation may be the most politically difficult of the three structural
 
components to control, program interaction is the most complicated and
 
amorphous. It will continue to frustrate attempts to control entitlement
 
spending through decreases in spending authority and program outlays alone.
 
Number of Beneficiaries
 
Not much needs be said about this persistent problem. Several of the
 
entitlement programs, particularly Social Security, Unemployment Insurance,
 
AFDC, Medicare, Medicaid, Supplementary Security Income, farm price sup
 
ports, etc., are particularly sensitive to the prevailing state of the
 
economy over which Congress has little control. The number of program
 
beneficiaries swells and decreases with depressed economic conditions and
 
boom times. The great expansion in the unemployment ranks was primarily
 
responsible for a 15% increase in entitlement expenditures between 1980-82,
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for example. And given the fact of program interaction and the great
 
probability of continued high unemployment through at least 1985, holding
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TABLE Iir-10:	 ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF CHANGING ELIGIBILITY
 
REQUIREMENTS TO ACHIEVE A 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN
 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OUTLAYS IN FISCAL YEAR 1983,
 
BY INTERACTING PROGRAM
 
Interacting Increase in Offset to Net Cut as Percent
 
Program Interacting Each Dollar of Previous Unemployment
 
Program's Gut In Insurance Outlays,
 
Outlays Unemployment Including Offsets
 
(In Percents) Insurance
 
(In Cents)
 
Food 	Stamps 1 ' 3," ■ ■ ■ , . 19 
Free/Reduced-

Price Luiich^ 0 0 20^
 
Overall Effects, All
 
Levels of Government'^ 3 19
 
Effect on federal budget 3 19
 
Effect on state and 0
 0
 
local budgets
 
SOURCE: CBO estimates. See Interactions, op. cit., p* 32.
 
a. 	 National School Lunch Program providing free or reduced-price
 
school lunch.
 
b. 	 The offsets are small enough that the net cut rounds to 20 percent.
 
c. 	 The effects on different levels of government are not additive, but
 
must be computed separately.
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entitlement expenditures down will be virtually impossible without
 
additional eligibility and benefit level changes, similar to those
 
in the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act. Such rules changes, however,
 
cannot be continually resorted to without fundamentally altering the
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aims, intents and purposes of the programs themselves.
 
The number of program clients will also increase naturally as the
 
population grows older; as more of the "temporary unemployed" become
 
permanent due to the decline in manufacturing/industrial jobs and other
 
social-economic changes; and as the population itself continues to ex
 
pand. As is the case with indexation and program interaction, and possi
 
bly more so in this instance, the pressure of this structural problem
 
of entitlements will not just go away, and will consistently impact
 
entitlement outlays.
 
CHAPTER IV CAN CONGRESS CONTROL ENTITLEMENTS WITHIN THE
 
BUDGETARY PROCESS? ~ THE POTENTIAL OF RECONCILIATION
 
 As defined in the introduction, congressional "control" of
 
entitlements in this thesis means Congress having the ability, under
 
current law and the structure of the budgetary process, to enact
 
effective constraints on the growth of federal spending for entitle
 
ment programs. In this and the following chapter, the question of
 
whether Congress indeed has that capacity, or has the immediate
 
probability of acquiring it, is explored.
 
During the initial years of the budget process, congressional
 
attempts at constraining the growth of entitlement spending were
 
mainly confined to Budget Committee assumptions of legislative
 
savings as part of budget resolutions. However, this seldom if ever
 
worked, since there was no real incentive for Congress to enact those
 
assumed savings, and much interest group pressure and other motivations
 
for it not to, and consequently, it very rarely did.^ Currently,
 
there are only two viable options available for Congress to have
 
control over entitlement spending. The first option is a distinctive
 
component of the budgetary process itself and is the subject of this
 
chapter: reconciliation. The second option has been repeatedly
 
mentioned throughout this thesis: structural changes in the nature
 
of entitlements within the budgetary process (i.e., indexation, program
 
interaction and number of beneficiaries, etc.).
 
rt Q A 5
 
Ellwood, Schick, Pechman and Ippollto, four contemporary
 
analysts of the budgetary process, all view reconciliation as the
 
principal weapon Congress currently possesses to control entitlement
 
spending. What is this reconciliation procedure and what are its
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strengths and limitations relative to cpntrolling entitlements?
 
Reconciliation as a combined series of legislative activities
 
inherently tied to established legislative habits, procedural rules,
 
standards and jurisdictions, was originally created by Section 310
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of the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Act. It is a legislative
 
process itself part of the broader budgetary process, and is,
 
according to the Budget Act, associated with and follows the
 
second concurrent budget resolution mandated for enactment no later
 
than Spetember 15th every year. Under the terms of the Budget Act,
 
reconciliation technically has two stages: a set of reconciliation
 
instructions which is included in the second budget resolution, and
 
a reconciliation bill which summarizes the congressional implement
 
ation of those instructions. Both stages must go through the
 
regular steps of congressional approval.^
 
More specifically. Section 310 authorizes, within both the
 
Senate and the House, each congressional Budget Committee to produce
 
a proposed second concurrent budget resolution which consists of the
 
8
 
specific spending ceilings and revenue floors for both budget authority,
 
and spending authority,^ plus recommended changes in revenue laws,
 
a current accounting of the public debt, and the set of instructions
 
directing congressional committees to report new legislation designed
 
to accomplish outlays within such ceilings and floors. Those in
 
structions specify that committees can recommend changes in the
 
amount of new and old (prior years') budget authority, and new spending
 
. 10
 
authority.
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After congressional approval of this resolution and the instructions.
 
Section 310 mandates that the Budget Committees receive, compile and
 
summarize the reports and recommendations from the other relevant con
 
gressional committees pursuant to those instructions, and without sub­
stantively revising them, compose these reports and recommendations
 
into either a reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution. This
 
reconciliation proposal is then mandated for submission to the full
 
Congress, to be approved, including conference adjustments, by no
 
later than September 25th, and Congress is ordered not to adjourn
 
until such reconciliation activity is completed, once it has been
 
initiated.
 
Based on the Budget Act, the proposed reconciliation document's
 
primary purpose is to bring existing laws into conformity with current
 
budget policies by resolving the differences in the legislative budget
 
decisions made during the period between the first budget resolution's
 
spending—revenue targets and the second's specific ceilings and floors.
 
Reconciliation, according to the Act, was primarily aimed at reconciling
 
new and prior year budget authority (appropriations) and new entitle
 
ments (spending authority) with the budget limitations of the second
 
resolution. Reconciliation, as mandated in the Budget Act, focuses
 
on reconciling laws and congressional budget policy, not program
 
. 12

modifications per se.
 
In the years since the passage of the Budget Act, particularly
 
since 1980, the year that Congress first implemented the reconciliation
 
process into its budgetary decisions, there have been several very
 
significant adaptations in how reconciliation works within
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the budgetary process.
 
(1). Reconciliation instructions have been "permanently" shifted
 
from the second resolution to being included in the first
 
resolution. This has been the regular procedure since the
 
13
 
fiscal 1981 budget formulation.
 
(2). Reconciliation now focuses regularly on changing legislation
 
providing prior budget authority, rather than just existing
 
law. It is primarily focussed on laws, not programs. New
 
appropriations are now generally ignored by reconciliation,
 
and instead past appropriations authority and already existing
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entitlements are the focus.
 
(3). According to the language of the Budget Act, neither re
 
conciliation nor any of the budget resolutions were to cover the
 
revision of conventional authorizing legislation. Since such
 
legislation was still under the purview of the Appropriations
 
Committees, it was not originally deemed to be a problem.
 
However, reconciliation instructions now regularly direct
 
committees to recommend changes in non-entitlement authorizing
 
legislation, since some of it ba.sically determines the level
 
of some outlays when it sets up eligibility and payment require
 
ments for programs. Food Stamps and disaster assistance are
 
examples.
 
(4). The Budget Act perceived congressional budgeting as an annual
 
process only. Currently, for both practical and political
 
reasons, reconciliation is seen and used as a multiyear process.
 
 with each budget resolution setting revenue and spending
 
goals for the coming fiscal year, plus the next two fiscal
 
or outyears. The outyear goals are non-binding targets
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only.
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Reconciliation as a
 
Control for Entitlements
 
Major advantages of the current reconciliation process as it
 
affects entitlements include:
 
(a). The shift to the start of the budget process enables the Budget
 
Committees to literally force the review of existing entitlements
 
by reporting a reconciliation instruction to change previous
 
laws mandating entitlement programs.
 
(b). The fact that reconciliation can be used to require authorizing
 
committees to lower authorization of appropriation limits for
 
entitlements and Other programs provides an effective tool
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for those interests seeking to limit entitlement spending.
 
(c). The fact that the reconciliation process causes a significant
 
shift in the traditional congressional bias towards more
 
spending for programs by focusing the congressional debates
 
onto issues that affect revenue—spending totals—the whole
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budget—rather than individual programmatic concerns.
 
The major disadvantages of the current reconciliation process
 
as it affects entitlements include:
 
(a). The fact that the reconciliation process increases budgetary
 
uncertainty by motivating heightened legislative conflict amid
 
a large number of congressional activities. In the 1980 re­
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conciliation process at least 20 congressional committees
 
were involved, and in 1981, 30. Because there are so many
 
legislative activities requiring manipulation and organization
 
in the reconciliation process, it can rather easily be blockrd,
 
stalled or substantially slowed down at any number of points.
 
Additionally, entitlement programs previously established as
 
relatively permanent guarantees of continually expanded funding
 
and benefits have lost some of that stability, forcing their
 
interest groups and congressional supporters to fight harder
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to defend them.
 
(b). The fact that the reconciliation process depends primarily on
 
changing prior authorizations and rules of eligibility for en
 
titlement programs for its effect on them means that the process
 
is inherently limited in how many times such amending, revising
 
and alterations of entitlement laws can be accomplished without
 
substantially changing the nature, intent, goals and purposes
 
of the entitlements.
 
(c). The fact that much of the budget remains heavily dependent on
 
and influenced by the prevailing state of the economy and the
 
demographic vagaries of our current society. Federal receipts and
 
obligations remain tied to automatic responses to high unem
 
ployment, growth in the incidence of poverty, the numbers
 
of elderly, indexation of cost of living adjustments, other
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beneficiary characteristics, inflation, etc. Thus reconcili
 
ation alone cannot ensure a decline in the levels of govern
 
ment spending in general, or fot entitlements in particular.
 
The process will have.to be accompanied by structural changes
 
in indexing, program interaction and other budgetary elements
 
in order to evolve from a potentially consistent vehicle for
 
controlling entitlement growth to an actual one.
 
The next section examines the budgetary outcomes for entitlements
 
through the reconciliation process since 1980. The economic assumptions
 
used as the basis of the estimated savings are shown in Table
 
IV-1 .
 
Reconciliation and Entitlements: 1980 - 1983 Outcomes
 
1980
 
The 1980 Omnibus Reconciliation Act has been called, "the first
 
coherent effort any Congress has made to bring this so-called 'uncontroll­
21

able* spending under control.*' The first budget resolution to which
 
it was attached had called for $10.6 billion in savings, and although
 
it officially resulted in $8.28 billion —$4.6 billion in outlays and
 
$3,645 in new revenues —much of which was either temporary, predominantly
 
paper cuts or both, the effort was judged a very successful precedent.
 
It utilized the devices of tightening some ehtitlement eligibility
 
rules (e.g., the school lunch program), reducing farm support subsidies,
 
tightening extended unemployment benefits, postponing and/or limiting
 
Medicare and Medicaid hospital pa5anents, shifting programs to off-

budget status and reducing interest subsidies and COLAs, among bther
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things. Its final version, passed December 3, 1980 (two months
 
after the fiscal year had begun), included the following results
 
relative to entitlements.
 
(1). It authorized extended funding for two child nutrition programs-­
one of them, the supplemental feeding program for women, infants
 
and children until 1984— based on amendments which were part
 
of neither the House nor Senate reconciliation bills, but
 
were added during the congressional conference period. This
 
authorization could have been overturned on a point of order
 
but no one officially challenged it for fear of upsetting the
 
delicate balanced achieved. In effect, it legislated an
 
action already pending in a bill due to go to the appropriations
 
23
 
committee, making the latter moot.
 
(2). Authorized $840 million in budget authority savings and
 
$826 million in outlays by lowering subsidies for some other
 
child nutrition programs, reducing the number of non-lower
 
income eligibles for school lunch programs, tightening
 
collection procedures and increasing student loan interest
 
rates, and limiting COLAs for Federal Employees Compensation
 
Act benefits to once a year rather than twice.
 
(3). Authorized $429 million in budget authority savings and $463
 
million in outlays by repealing double-dipping COLAs by
 
retiring federal employees, but maintained twice-a-year
 
regular COLAs for military and federal retirees.
 
(4). Authorized $12 million in budget authority savings and
 
$915 million in outlays by deferring the periodic interim
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TABLE IV-1: COMBINED ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
 
AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CALENDER YEARS 1981-85
 
Projected
 
1983 1984 1985
Economic indicator 1981 1982
 
Percent change, year to year
 
GNP in current dollars
 
Reagan administration 11,3 8.1 11.5 10.2 9.7
 
Congressional Budget Office 11.3 7.5 11.9 10.4 9.7
 
CNF in constant 1972 dollars
 
Reagan administration 2.0 0.2 5.0
5.2 4.7
 
Congressional Budget Office 2.0 -0.1 4.4 3.6 3.5
 
GNF deflator
 
Reagan administration 9.1 7.9 6.0 5.0 4.7
 
Congressional Budget Office 9.1 7.5 7.3 6.6 6.0
 
Consumer price index
 
Reagan administration 10.3 7.3 6.0 4.6 4.8
 
Congressional Budget Office 10.3 7.5 6.9
6.9 6.4
 
Percent, annual average
 
Unemployment rate
 
Reagan administration 7.6 8.9 7.9 7.1 6.4
 
Congressional Budget Office 7.6 8.9 8.0 7.4 7.2
 
Treasury bill rate
 
Reagan administration 14.1 11.7 10.5 9.5 8.5
 
Congressional Budget Office 14.1 12.0 13.2 11.3 9.4
 
Source: Budgetofthe United States Government.Fiscal Year 1983. pp. 2-5. 2-7;and Congressional Budget Office.
 
The Prospectsfor Economic Recovery,report to the Senate and House Committeeson the Budget,part I(Government
 
Printing Office, 1982). p. xviii.
 
Cited in, J.A. Pechman, ed.,Setting National Priofitdes; The
 
1983 Budget (Brookings: Washington, D.C.)^ P- ^0­
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payments made to hospitals to once in September, and altering '
 
the Medicare reimbursement schedule to recognize costs-per­
service-performed rather than costs-per-claim-processed.
 
At the same time, increased spending was authorized for health
 
program expansions for home services, outpatient rehab care
 
and physical therapy.
 
(5). Authorized $32 million in budget authority savings and $147
 
million in outlays through rescinding the government pajnnent
 
to the states in reimbursement for unemployment aid to laid-off
 
CETA workers; terminating government reimbursement procedures
 
for at least the first week of extended benefits in states
 
not requiring applicants to wait until after week one to
 
receive benefits, and tightening eligibility requirements
 
for extended unemplojnnent compensation.
 
(6). Authorized $117 million in budget authority savings and $270
 
million in outlays by restricting retroactive Social Security
 
benefits to no more than 6 months prior to eligibility application;
 
and by repealing Social Security disability eligibility for
 
convicted felons; postponing implementation of new rules for
 
day care centers; enacting the 1980 Social Security Disability
 
Amendments; and transferring trust funds from the disability
 
category to the old age and survivors' categories within the
 
OASDI trust fund.
 
Overall what the 1980 Reconciliation Act did was to establish
 
the congressional precedent for effectively using the process to shape
 
-55­
and mold relative control of entitlement expenditure increases. It
 
did not definitely establish the full range and scope of the process'
 
potential viz-a-viz entitlements, but it did show the process' promise
 
as an invaluable tool, along with some of its limitations.
 
1981
 
The 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act provided a very ambitious pre
 
cedent for the scope of the reconciliation process. It included re­
24
 
visions for at least 250 federal programs and 232 program accounts.
 
It also provided a more definitive exposition of the capacity of the
 
reconciliation process, in executive branch and congressional hands,
 
to cope better with entitlement spending. It again demonstrated the
 
multidimensionality of the difficulty of holding down federal entitle
 
ment expeditures: in spite of presidential and some congressional
 
rhetoric to the contrary, entitlement spending for fiscal 1982 and
 
1983 (estimated) 	still increased by double digit percentage points
 
25
 
over fiscal 1981. Indexation, program interaction and the numbers
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of eligibles had 	a great deal to do with those uncontrolled increases.
 
The 1981 Reconciliation Act was passed on July 31. It was part
 
of a broader process that year to hold down not just government
 
spending but to cut and reduce expenditures substantially. The
 
three-pronged attack utilized by Congress to accomplish this feat
 
included rescission of prior appropriations, reconciliation, and
 
appropriations reductions. For conventional authorizations and
 
indexed appropriations (e.g. Food Stamps, etc.) minimum cut savings
 
were achieved in 	the first stage by amending the authorization of
 
-56­
appropriations limits for targeted programs previously budgeted (re
 
scission)^ and in the second stage, deeper cuts were made by the
 
appropriations committees' granting of budget authority even further
 
■ 27 
below the amended authorizatiQn of appropriations limits,^ 
Approximately 4Q% of the budget authority reduction and 39% 
of the outlay savings contained in the Act were achieved through-
amending entitlement authorization^ of income assistance programs 
so that eligibility rules and benefit formulas were substantially 
modified. These were actual and permanent cuts. Appropriated en 
titlements had both their original authorizations: amended, and ap­
28
 
propriations coiimittee reduGtion of their budget authority..
 
Relative to entitlements, the 19.81 Reconciliation Act included the
 
following,
 
1). It authorized the amendment of the Higher Education Act to
 
affect eligibility criteria for the Guaranteed Student Loan program
 
so that $30,000 is a relative income barrier beyond which, students
 
may be deemed ineligible. In addition, reconciliation raised interest
 
rates in the parent loan subsidiary to the GSL, established a loan
 
origination fee of 5Z which was to be paid by each student borrower,
 
reduced the special allowance payment to lenders, and revised some
 
regulations for the Student Loan Marketing Association. Overall,
 
some $479 million in budget authority savings were claimed for fiscal
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1982, $844 million for 1983, and $1,353 million for fiscal 1984.
 
2)_. It authorized that the Title XX Social Services program be
 
merged with two smaller Title XX programs. It also allowed $2.4
 
billion dollars for fiscal 1982( a 23% cut of $698.7 million)., $2.45
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billion for 1983 (with a 24% cut in budget authority), and 2.5 billion
 
for fiscal 1984 (with a 25% cut of $811,5 million). . Some administrative
 
requirements were dropped and eligibility rules were broadened (e.g.,
 
the requirement that 50% of funds be used for welfare recipients was
 
repealed). Otherwise the major effect of reconciliation on this
 
state entitlement was to give states complete control over the programs,
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and with no state matching fund requirement.
 
3). Authorized increased state discretion over hospital reimbursements
 
for Medicaid, and other operations within the program, thereby reducing
 
the federal responsibility for Medicaid program activity. .The Act
 
also extended Medicaid coverage to home and community facilities,
 
authorized the states to define their own medical needy, and revised
 
several administrative provisions. There was a restriction of AFDG .
 
client categorical eligibility and a reduction in federal matching
 
requirements. The net effect of all this was to reduce federal Ifedicaid
 
31 ■ 
expenditures by an estimated 5% each year from fiscal 1982—84.
 
4). For Medicare, the Act increased the deductible beneficiaries
 
are required to pay for Medicare universal hospital insurance, authorized
 
a reduction in reimbursement rates for hospital and home health care,
 
and rescinded medicare coverage payments for new procedures which had
 
not yet been implemented. For the supplementary medical insurance
 
portion of Medicare, the deductible was increased and carryover de—
 
ductibles from one year to the next were prohibited. Together, these
 
changes are estimated to have reduced Medicare expenditures by $491
 
million for fiscal 1982, or 3% from what they would have been, according
 
to CBO current policy baseline estimates. Medicare costs had risen
 
by over 45% just between 1979-81, and cutting them remains a Reagan
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. 32
 
priority.
 
5). It authorized restricted eligibility and reduced benefits for
 
the Trade Assistance Adjustment program, and introduced regulations
 
seeking to redirect the program's emphasis on cash assistance to
 
funding for employment searches and relocation. These changes caused
 
an 85% reduction for fiscal 1982, with 82% scheduled for 1983 if the
 
program is not completely eliminated as the Reagan proposal has
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requested.
 
6). It authorized restricted eligibility for unemployment compensation
 
extended benefits and charged higher interest rates for federal loans
 
to states in an effort to discourage bailout activity. The effort
 
achieved only minimal and temporary savings, however, reducing expenditures
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by 1% in 1981, 4% for 1982, and 1% estimated in 1983-84.
 
7). It authorized large budget authority reductions in the Special
 
Milk program by reducing the eligibility of participating institutions
 
(especially private schools) for subsidies, restricting the income
 
criteria for individual eligibility, and eliminating the overlap with
 
the national lunch, breakfast, commodity-only and child care food pro
 
grams. Estimated reductions were $100 million a year; a 75% reduction.
 
The program has been being reduced since 1978, and is proposed for
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elimination in fiscal 1983.
 
8). It authorized very large reductions in the child nutrition programs,
 
amounting to $1.4 billion in fiscal 1982, $1.5 billion in 1983, and
 
$1.6 billion in 1984. These were achieved by restricting eligibility
 
for free and reduced-price lunches and lowering overall meal subsidies.
 
In the school lunch program, for example, the free meal subsidy was
 
reduced by 3%, reduced-price lunches by 23% and full-price lunches
 
by 34%.^^
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9). For Supplemental Security Income, the Reconciliation Act autho
 
rized only small eligibility-restriction reductions, including the
 
elimination of the Social Security minimum benefit category, which
 
has since been reversed.
 
10). For AFDC, the Act authorized increased work requirements for
 
beneficiaries, tightened the rules for counting earnings by AFDC
 
recipients, altered the formulas for calculating income, restricted
 
categorical eligibility provisions, streamlined program admini
 
stration and decreased administrative costs. The estimated savings
 
was $1.1 billion, with approximately 18% of AFDC families and 19% of
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the children losing eligibility for the program.
 
What was the general effect of the reductions in entitlements?
 
There was a $11.3 billion cut in fiscal '82 entitlement outlays, and
 
$37.2 billion estimated over three years. But these were the rela
 
tively "easy" cuts that will not soon be repeated or matched. For
 
reconciliation to really make a significant impact on the entitlement
 
problem, more of the 1981 activity would have to be re-done continually
 
arid consistently, and in all probability, that will not happen in the
 
foreseeable future. For example, for fiscal 1982-83, the Reagan admini
 
stration requested such additional cuts, but Congress rejected them.
 
This kind of effort to gain control of entitlements through annual pro
 
gram alterations and adjustments is expected to generate increasing
 
political opposition almost inevitably, and should not be relied upon
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as the major strategy for gaining control of entitlement spending.
 
The fiscal 1983 Reconciliation Act was far less sweeping than the
 
previous year's and affected entitlement benefits and eligibility only
 
slightly. It revised COLAS for government retirees, reduced farm program
 
1982 
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supports, slightly modified veterans' benefits. Medicare and Medicaid,
 
and further restricted AFDC, SSI and UI benefits. The estimated cuts for
 
each year of the multiyear 1983-85 period were $4.1 billion for the
 
cost-of-living adjustments, $4.2 billion in farm subsidies, $552 million
 
from veterans' programs, $13.3 billion for Medicare, $1.14 billion for
 
Medicaid, $343 million for AFDC, $386 million for SSI, and $17 million
 
for
 
1). The Act authorized a new .5% user fee on VA-supported home loans, a
 
delay in some compensation and veterans' benefits, a rounding off of
 
benefit checks to the next lowest rather than next highest dollar, and a
 
I
 
change in the date for new benefit reductions coming from a transition in
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 dependency status.
 
2). Authorized, for the first time, a significant 50% reduction in COLAS
 
for younger federal retirees (under 62 years old), delayed by one month
 
the effective date of COLAS (from March 1 to April 1, 1983, May, 1984, and
 
June, 1985), and eliminated double-dipping by military retirees who take
 
other federal civilian jobs. Additionally, the Act authorized rounding
 
benefit payments to their lowest dollar, delaying the date of payment of
 
a retiree's first check, modifying other disability and early retirement
 
regulations and adjusting the computation of military service into civil
 
service retirement benefits.
 
3). It authorized a multiyear reduction in the wheat, feed grain and rice
 
programs estimated at $274 million dollars by requiring new payments to
 
farmers for not growing them; and it authorized a cut in the support of
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 dairy prices unless production was reduced.
 
4). For Medicare, the savings authorized were from establishing new limits
 
on hospital reimbursement rates and the dates for federal payments. For
 
Medicaid, the anticipated savings were from modifying certain provisions
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allowed to state discretion (e.g. permitted states to charge nominal
 
Z).
 
fees, to certain Medicaid patients, etc.)*
 
The estimated savings for Medicare, Medicaid, AFDC, Supplemental
 
Security Income and Unemployment Insurance, were all included in the
 
1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act. This document was the
 
response of the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate Finance
 
Committee, to their fiscal 1983 reconciliation instructions. These
 
two committees have jurisdiction over most of the entitlement programs
 
in the budget. Although, passed in a seemingly separate legislative
 
activity, the Tax Equity Act was just another part of the reconciliation
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process for fiscal 1983.
 
5). The Reconciliation Act authorized first month prorating of AFDC
 
benefits based on the date of application, a rounding off of benefits,
 
to the lowest dollar, an exclusion of families of absent military
 
fathers from AFDC eligibility, a permission for states to require
 
participants to look for work, and a requirement that the income of
 
unrelated adults living with AFDC beneficiaries be added into the
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calculations for benefits.
 
6). For SSI, the same proration and rounding off of provisions as
 
in AFDC were authorized, along with a one-month, benefit reduction
 
associated with a COLA for Social Security payments, and an exclusion
 
of burial spaces as countable assets. For UI, jobless benefits were
 
extended, increasing outlays rather than reducing spending, rounding
 
off of benefits to the lowest dollar was permitted, students enrolled
 
in a fulltime work-study or internship program were exempted from
 
FUTA taxes, and permission was granted to deny UI compensation to
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certain non-teaching, non-research or non-administrative staff of
 
■ 47 
colleges and universities.
 
Were Entitlements "Controlled" Through the Reconciliation Process, 1980-83?
 
Table IV-2 shows that for each year the Reconciliation Act was enacted
 
as a part of the budgetary process, overall entitlement spending still in
 
creased significantly, as did the percentage of entitlement spending in
 
the budget. What can be said of the overall effect of the reconciliation
 
process reductions in entitlement spending for the 1980-83 period is that
 
the growth rates for the "other" entitlement categories (the means-tested
 
programs most deeply affected by the 1980-83 budget cuts) seem to have
 
been abated somewhat for the near future. However, this statement does
 
not apply to either Unemployment Insurance outlays, SSl or Food Stamp
 
outlays, all of whose growth rates increased between 1 and 9 billion/year
 
from 1980-83. See Table IV-3.
 
Additionally, nothing accomplished through reconciliation 1980-83
 
significantly affected either Social Security outlays or Medicare/
 
Medicaid expenditures. Thus far, all three remain impervious to bud
 
getary restraints.
 
Has reconciliation thus far resulted in increased congressional con
 
trol over entitlement spending in the budget? For certain programs, like
 
child nutrition, guaranteed student loans and AFDC, the answer is at best
 
mixed. For the majority of entitlement programs, particularly the gigan
 
tic Social Security and health programs, the answer is decidedly no.
 
Again, there are structural®factors of entitlements which, unless fun
 
damentally changed (as opposed to cosmetic, haphazard modifications),
 
will consistently foil even the best intended congressional attempts at
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controlling entitlement spending, even given the immense potential of
 
the reconciliation process.
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TABLE IV-2; COMPOSITION OF FEDERAL SPENDING, 1980-1988
 
Category 1980 1982 1983 1984 1988
 
As a Percent of GNP
 
5.3 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.5
National Defense
 
Entitlements and Other
 
Mandatory Spending
 
Social Security benefits 4.5 5.0 5.3 5.1 4.9
 
Medicare and Medicaid
 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.4 3.0
 
0.1 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.1
Farm price supports
 
4.0 3.7 3.9 3.4 2.7
Other entitlements
 
Subtotal
 10.5 11.4 12.1 11.2 10.7
 
Nondefense Discretionary
 
5.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 3.8
Spending
 
2.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8
Net Interest
 
Offsetting Receipts -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9
 
22.5 24.0 25.0 24.3 23.9
Total
 
As a Percent of Total Outlays
 
23.6 26.7 28.5 31.3
National Defense 25.7
 
Entitlements and Other
 
Mandatory Spending
 
Social Security benefits 20.1 21.0 21.0 21.1 20.3
 
Medicare and Medicaid
 8.4 9.2 9.5 10.1 12.4
 
Farm price supports 0.5 1.6 2.2 1.1 0.4
 
Other entitlements 17.6 15.5 15.6 14.0 11.5
 
Subtotal 46.6 47.1 48.2 46.3 44.6
 
Nondefense Discretionary
 
24.5 19.1 18.2 18.0 16.1
Spending
 
9.1 11.6 10.9 11.2 11.7
Net Interest
 
Offsetting Receipts -3.7 -3.7 -4.0 -4.0 -3.6
 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
SOURCE; CBO, Deficits, 1983, op. cit., p. 12.
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TABLE IV-3 FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR"OTHER ENTITLEMENT"PROGRAMS **
 
(In billions of dollars)
 
Actual Estimated
 
Major Program 1980 1982
 1983 198^ 1985 1986 1987 1988
 
Benefits for Individuals
 
Non-Means-Tested Programs
 
Unemployment
 
Insurance 16.^ 2^.3 33.0 27.8 26.5 26.1 25.9 25.6
 
Trade Adjustment
 
Assistance 1.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 a/ a/ a/ a/
 
Veterans' Compensation 7A 9.3 9.9 10.2 10.6 10.9 11.2 11.3
 
Black Lung . 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
 
Railroad Retirement b/ ^.7 5.3 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.4
 
Means-Tested Programs
 
AFDC c/ 7.3 8.0 8.1 8.^ 8.5 8.8 9.1 9.5
 
551 d/ 6.^ 7.7 8.6 7A 8.1 8.4
 8.6 9.6
 
Veterans' Pensions 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7
 3.6 3.5 3.5
 
Food 5tamps e/ 9.1 11.0 12.^ 12.2 12.5 13.1 13.5 13.8
 
Partially Means-Tested
 
Programs f/
 
Guaranteed 5tudent
 
Loans 1.^ 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5
 
Child Nutrition ^.7
 ^.6 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.7 6.0
 
Public Service Grants for
 
States and Localities
 
General Revenue
 
Sharing 6.9 ^.6 ^.6 ^.7 5.0
 5.2 5.5 5.7
 
Title XX Social
 
Services 2.8 2.6
 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7
 
Total 75.5 87.^ 97.6 92.2 93.4 95.0 96.4 98.4
 
a.
 Less than $50 million.
 
b. About 60 percent of outlays for Railroad Retirement provide Social Security benefits for
 
retired railroad workers.
 
c.
 AFDC estimates include the Child Support Enforcement program.
 
d. Fiscal years 1983 and 1988 include 13 months of benefits; fiscal year 198^ includes 11
 
months.
 
e. Estimates include nutrition assistance for Puerto Rico.
 
f. These programs, while partially means-tested,do serve some higher-income households.
 
SOURCE: CBO, Deficits^ 83, op. cit. p ^^2^3
 
This table also used as TABLE V-7 in next chapter.
 
CHAPTER V: CAN ENTITLEMENTS BE CONTROLLED UNDER THEIR PRESENT
 
STRUCTURES WITHIN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS?
 
PRESENT AND IMMEDIATE-FUTURE STRATEGIES
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Chapter IV identified two available options necessary for Congress to
 
constrain the growth of spending for entitlement programs. Reconciliation,
 
one of those options, has several limitations which restrict it from being
 
the panacea device Congress needs to enact such dontrol (.See p.51),The other,
 
making structural changes in the nature of entitlements within the bud
 
getary system, also is limited by the political dynamics of congressional
 
activity and tradition. Alone, neither option has much chance of succeeding.
 
Combined, reconciliation provides the necessary access and opportunity
 
within the budgetary process for significant structural changes to be made,
 
and the impetus for such changes adds the ingredient needed for reconciliation
 
to become the effective procedural device for controlling entitlements that
 
its proponents say it can.
 
In order to demonstrate the viability of that assertion, this chapter
 
discusses, in some detail, the majority of the current and immediate-future
 
strategies being considered and/or implemented to constrain entitlement
 
spending,and their cost implications as a measurement of their potential to
 
control entitlements. It is a given that reconciliation and the budget
 
process are the vehicles through which any of these strategies would be
 
implemented.
 
Both the 0MB and the CBO have done recent studies analyzing strategies
 
to reduce entitlement spending. Both sets of strategies and the economic
 
assumptions they are based,on provide the data for the discussion here.
 
Additionally, both the CBO and the President's National Commission on Social
 
Security Reform have analyzed the nature and future of the biggest entitle
 
ment of all in the federal budget: Social Security. Though some of the
 
strategies they both discuss are similar, they too are based on different
 
economic assumptions, on the one hand, and the CBO's analysis seems to
 
incorporate more structured change options than does that of the Commission,^
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on the other. Table IV-1 from the preceding chapter shows the relevant
 
economic assumptions for the CBO and the 0MB analyses. The assumptions
 
for the National Commission study on Social Security are shown in Table
 
V-1. It includes three alternative assumptions: optimistic, intermediate
 
and pessimistic, plus their consequences. Additionally, assumptions in
 
II-A of the Table, for the years 1981-87, are updated versions of the
 
Reagan administrations's economic assumptions for fiscal 1983.
 
This chapter discusses most of the entitlement categories defined in
 
earlier chapters of this thesis. The interest on the public debt is not
 
included since there are presently few, if any, strategies being con
 
sidered to control it, other than reducing the federal deficit in general.
 
I. Social Security
 
There are two cash benefit sections of Social Security: the OASI and
 
DI (Disability Insurance).^ Together (as OASDI) they account for more
 
than 20% of the entire federal budget, and more than 40% of the costs
 
2
 
of all of the government programs providing benefits to individuals.
 
The other two trust funds comprising Social Security are the Hospital
 
Insurance Trust Fund (HI), and the Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust
 
Fund (SMI). The OASDI and HI funds are primarily financed through payroll
 
taxes, and the SMI by the Treasury through the General Fund and enrollee
 
premiums.
 
The problems of Social Security financing principally concern OASDI
 
funding and are mainly twofold: the short-term difficulty resulting from
 
a steady increase in benefit payments continually exceeding concomitant
 
increases in payroll tax revenues; and the long-term difficulty of a
 
major increase in the retirement population projected for the near future.
 
The short-term imbalance between outlays and receipts is a consequence
 
of the economic crises of the late 1970's and 1980's and their reflections
 
3 
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TABLE V-1:THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM—
 
SELECTED ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS BY ALTERNATIVE.CALENDAR YEARS
 
1960-2060
 
Average annual percentage increase
 
Average Average
 
wages m Average annual
 
covered Real-wage annual in unemploy
 
employ Consumer differential' terest rate* ment rate*
 
Calendar year Real GNP' ment prico index (percent) (percent) (percent)
 
Past expenence:
 
1960-64 4.0 3.4 1.3 2.1 3.7
 5.7
 
1965-69 4.4 5.4 3.4 2.0 5.2
 3.8
 
1970 .2 4.9 5.9 -1.0 7.3
 4.9
 
1971 3.4 4.9 4.3 .6 6.0
 5.9
 
5.6
 
1973 5.8 6.9 6.2 .7 6.6
 
. ..
1972 5.7 73 3.3 4.0 5.9
 
4.9
 
1974 
-.6 7.4 11.0 -3.6 7.5 5.6
 
1975.. -1.1 6.6 9.1 -2.5 7.4 8.5
 
1976 5.4 •8.2 5.7 *2.5 7.1 7.7
 
1977 5.5 '8.0 6.5 '1.5 7.1 7.0
 
1978 4.8 '8.2 7.6 *.6 8.2 6.0
 
1979 3.2 '8.8 11.4 '-2.6 9.1 5.8
 
1980 -2 •8.6 13.5 '-4.9 11.0 7.1
 
Altematrve 1:
 
1981 •2.1 8.8 10.3 -1.5 13.3 7.6
 
1982 1.1 8.2 6.3 1.9 12.7 8.6
 
1983 5.6 7.3 5.9 1.4 10.3 7.4
 
1984 5.4 7.5 4.6 2.9 7.8 6.5
 
1985 5.1 7.0 4.2 2.8 6.6 5.8
 
1986 4.8 6.7 3.8 2.9 6.0 5.4
 
.
1987 4.6 6.4 3.4 3.0 5.7 5.0
 
1988 4.4 6.1 3.0 3.1 5.6 4.8
 
1989 4.2 5.7 2.6 3.1 5.4 4.6
 
1990.... 4.0 5.2 2.2 3.0 5.3 4.3
 
1995 3.4 4.5 2.0 2.5 5.1 4.0
 
2000 & later ^3.5 4.5 2.0 2.5 5.1 4.0
 
Alternative II-A*:
 
1981 •1.9 8.8 10.3 -1.5 13.3 7.6
 
1982 .3 8.6 6.8 1.8 13.4 8.9
 
1983 5.2 6.3 6.0 .3 12.1 7.9
 
1984 5.0 5.6 4.6 1.0 10.8 7.1
 
1985 4.8 7.4 4.8 2.6 9.8 6.4
 
1986 4.4 7.3 4.6 2.7 8.2 5.8
 
1987 4.3 7.1 4.5 2.6 6.7 5.3
 
1988 4.1 7.1 4.3 2.8 6.4 5.2
 
1989 3.9 6.6 3.9 2.7 6.2 5.1
 
1990 3.7 6.0 3.5 2.5 6.0 5.0
 
1995 3.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 5.6 5.0
 
2000 & later ^3.1 5.0 3.0 2.0 5.6 5.0
 
Alternative II-B:
 
1981 •1.8 8.6 10.3 -1.7 13.3 7.6
 
1982 -.8 6.6 6.9 -.3 13.0 9.1
 
1983 4.2 8.1 7.9 .2 11.4 8.5
 
1984 3.3 8.1 7.4 .7 9.3 8.0
 
1985 3.0 6.9 6.6 .3 8.0 7.7
 
1986 3.0 6.8 5.8 1.0 7.1 7.4
 
_
1987 3.0 6.6 5.5 1.1 6.8 7.1
 
1988 ^ 3.0 6.6 5.3 1.3 6.6 6.8
 
1989 3.0 6.4 4.9 1.5 6.5 6.4
 
1990 3.0 6.0 4.5 1.5 6.4 6.1
 
1995 2.5 5.5 4.0 1.5 6.1 5.0
 
2000& later '2.6 5-5 4.0 1.5 6.1 5.0
 
Alternative 111:
 
1981 •1.8 8.6 10.3 -1.7 , 13.3 7.6
 
1982 -1.5 6.3 7.2 -.9 13.1 9.3
 
1983 .6 7.3 9.6 -2.3 12.3 9.8
 
1984 2.5 7.8 9.6 -1.8 10.5 9.6
 
1985 3.8 9.2 9.2 .0 9.4 8.8
 
1986 2.9 9.1 8.8 .3 8.8 8.4
 
1987 Z7 8.7 8.4 .3 8.3 8.0
 
1988 2.7 8.5 8.0 .5 8.1 7.7
 
1989 2.7 8.3 7.6 .7 7.8 7.3
 
1990 2.7 8.0 7.2 .8 7.6 6.9
 
1995 1.8 6.2 5.2 1.0 6.7 6.0
 
2000 A later '2.1 6.0 5.0 1.0 6.6 -6.0
 
'The real GNP(Gross National Product)is the total output ofgoods and services expressed in constant dollars.
 
TTie difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages in covered employment and the percentage
 
increase in the average annual CPI.
 
TTie average of the interest rates determined in each of the 12 months of the year for special public-debt obligations
 
issuable to the trust funds.
 
•The ultimate rates are adjusted by age and sex based on the total labor force aged 16 and over as ofJuly 1. 1970. Rates
 
shown for earlier years are civilian unemployment rates for those years.
 
*Preliminary.
 
•The actual value of the 1981 increase in real GNP was 2.0 pcrcenL This value was not available at the time the cost
 
estimates were prepared; the cost estimates were based on the assumed increases in real GNP shown under the four
 
alternatives.
 
This value is for the year 2000. The annual percentage increase in real GNP is assumed to continue to change after
 
2000 under each alternative to reflect the dependence of labor force growth on the size and age-sex distribution of the
 
population. The percentage increases for 2060 are 3.4, 2.3, 2.1, and 1.0 for alternatives I, II-A. II-B, and HI. respectively.
 
•The economic assumptions in.alternative II-A for 1981-87 are identical to or derived from the assumptions underlying
 
the President's 1983 Budget, with the exception of the assumed 1981 increases in the nominal wage and the real wage as
 
well as the assumed 1982 increases in the real wage and the CPI, all of which have been adjusted to reflect actual
 
experience available since the Budget assumptions were released.
 
Assumptions 1= Optimistic Assumptions
 
Assumptions 11= Intermediate Assumptions
 
Assumptions 111= Pessimistic Assumptions
 
SOURCE: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL
 
SECURITY REFOPM, January, 1983. Appendix K, page 82,
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in the numerous cost-of-living adjustments, but not in the wages of
 
workers. Unchanged, the deficit trend for the OASDI fund alone is pro­
4
 
jected at $10.8 billion/year. The long-term problem is more demo
 
graphic than strictly economic, with the very age structure of the
 
American population projected to change by the early decades of the
 
21st century, combined with a fundamental decline in workers contri
 
buting to-Social Security relative to beneficiaries estimated by
 
5­
2030.
 
As previously mentioned, the reconciliation cuts during 1980-82
 
affected Social Security outlays by a small 2% reduction only. Partially,
 
this was because any significant reduction in Social Security benefits
 
was not viewed as politically expedient by Congress, but since OASDI
 
outlays are huge, even small percentage reductions like that translated
 
into billions of current dollars in reduced spending. However, the
 
averaged expenditures for the OASDI program still annually accounted
 
for close to $9 billion of the federal budget deficit during that same
 
6
 
period. The only significant reduction in overall Social Security bene
 
fits was during the 1980-82 elimination of benefits for post-secondary
 
students, as the other legislated cut—elimination of the minimum bene
 
fit threshold—was rather quickly restored for pre-1982 beneficiaries
 
after a storm of political protest.
 
Table V-II shows the Congressional Budget Office's projected OASDI
 
and Hospital Insurance expenditures for 1983-88. Without substantial
 
changes in current law, these projections predict a significant short
 
fall between expenditures and revenues for the next 5 years. (See
 
Table IV-I for the assumptions these projections are based on.) The
 
system will need approximately $71 billion in additional revenues for
 
1983-88 just to stave off insolvency, and the National Commission esti-^
 
mated that the system needs $150-200 billion overall during that period.^
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CURRENT LAW PROJECTIONS OF SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUND
 
TABLE V-2: OUTLAYS,INCOMES,AND BALANCES(In billions of dollars)
 
Actual Estimated Baseline Projection
 
1980 1982 1983 198^ 1985
 1986 1987 1988
 
Old Age and Survivors Insurance
 
TotalOutlays 103.2 137.9 152.7 16^.^ 176.5 189.1 216.1201.8 
Income a/ 100.1 126.6 1^6.5 138.3 150.8 162.5 172.7 185.1 
Year-End Balance 2^.6 12.5 6.3 -19.8 -^5.5 -72.1 -101.2 -132.1 
Start-of-Year 
Balance as Percent 
of Outlays 26.8 17.3 8.2 ■ 3.9 -11.2 -24.1 -35.7 -46.8 
Disability Insurance 
15.3 18.0 18.7 19.1 19.2 19.4 20.0 20.8
Total Outlays
 
21.U 19.0 26.8 32.7 37.4 41.0 45.0
Income a/ 17.A
 
Year-End Balance 7.7 6.8 7.0 14.8 28.3 46.3 67.2 91.4
 
Start-of-Year
 
Balance as Percent
 
of Outlays 36.6 18.8 36.0 37.0 77.0 146.0 231.2 323.9
 
Combined OAS!and DI
 
Total Outlays 118.5 156.0 171.4 183.5 195.6 208.5 221.8 236.8
 
Income a/ 117.^
 148.0 165.5 165.0 183.4 199.9 213.7 230.1
 
Year-End Balance 32.2 19.3 13.4 -5.1 -17.3 
 -25.8 -34.0 -40.7
 
Start-of-Year
 
Balance as Percent
 
28.1 17.5 11.3 7.3 -2.6 -8.3 -11.6 -14.3
of Outlays
 
Combined OASI,DI,and Hospital Insurance
 
227.8 245.3 265.8 288.3 311.6
TotalOutlays 1^2.8 190.8 210.4
 
Income a/
 U2.8 185.6 193.4 209.3 232.0 255.1 272.9 293.0
 
Year-End Balance i^6.7 40.1 23.2
 4.7 -8.6 -19.4 -34.7 -53.3
 
Start-of-Year
 
Balance as Percent
 
1.9 -3.2 -6.7 -11.1
of Outlays 32.7 23.8 19.1 10.2
 
NOlE: Minus signs denote a deficit.
 
a. 	 Income to the trust funds is budget authority. It includes payroll tax receipts, interest on
 
balances, and certain general fund transfers. Income in 1983 reflects interfund transfers as
 
authorized under the Social Security Amendments of 1981. In order to illustrate better the
 
operations of the trust funds under extended interfund or other types of borrowing or under
 
tax rate reallocation, estimated interest payments owed by a trust fund when it shows a
 
deficit are included as negative values in the income estimates of that trust fund.
 
SOURCE; Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options,
 
Congressional Budget Office (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
 
Printers, 1983), p. 67. Hereafter cited as CBO, Deficit ^83.
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Strategles to.Solve the Financing Problems of Social Security
 
The National Cotiraiission on Social Security Reform's study and the
 
principal CBO study cited here had two different aims. The National Commission
 
study was intended to find a practical way of keeping the Social Security sy
 
stem solvent, and thus all of their recommendations focused on effecting finan
 
cial savings and raising revenue. The CBO study, on the other hand, was pri
 
marily aimed at exploring effective strategies to reduce Social Security's
 
impact on the federal budget deficit in the near future, and only secondarily
 
at discussing strategies to keep Social Security solvent. As such, the CBO
 
study focused on both across-the-board and targeted reduction strategies.
 
Although variations of several of the strategies were included in both
 
studies (e.g., shifting COLAs and increasing selected tax rates), the CBO
 
study had a greater emphasis on structural change options than did the
 
National Commission study. In fact, the latter specifically recommended that
 
neither the fundamental structure of the Social Security program nor its
 
8
 
fundamental principles be altered.
 
Below is a summary analysis of the Social Security strategies discussed
 
by both studies. The 0MB analysis included in the President's fiscal 1983
 
package of budget proposals, defers any action on Social Security to the
 
9
 
National Commission's recommendations.
 
Across-the—Board Options;
 
A. Reducing the COLAs for Social Security
 
Reducing or eliminating COLAs has been an option bandied about for
 
several years. Such reduction was achieved for the 1983 fiscal year for
 
younger retirees, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, but it and all of
 
the other various COLA—reduction/elimination strategies depend heavily on
 
the rate of inflation to have much effect other than a negative one for
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elderly and disabled beneficiaries. Higher inflation rates when COLA-

reductions are legislated mean greater savings, thus the 1980-81 fiscal
 
10
 
years would have been better suited than the current year.
 
Reductions in COLAs would, theoretically., decrease the growth rate
 
of Social Security expenditures, but they would neither solve the short or
 
long-term solvency problem of the Social Security system nor necessarily
 
stabilize the trust funds of the system. In addition, such reductions
 
would increase the incidence of poverty among the elderly and disabled,
 
since the resultant loss of income would not usually be offset by signi
 
ficantly increased participation by Social Security beneficiaries in means-

tested programs like SSI and Food Stamps.
 
According to the CBO analysis, the four major COLA-reduction/elimination
 
options for the 1980's are a permanent COLA delay, capping COLAs, elimi
 
nating the 1983 COLA, and eliminating both the 1983 and 1984 COLAs. For
 
1984-85, a cumulative estimated $10.4 billion would be saved by permanently
 
switching the annual timing of COLAs from July to October, $57.9 billion
 
from capping COLAs at the CPI level less 2 percentage points, $33.7
 
billion for repealing the 1983 COLA alone, and an estimated $67.1 billion
 
12
 
will be saved by eliminating both the 1983 and 1984 COLAs. The National
 
Commission study recommended a permanent shift of the COLA payments to a
 
calender year rather than fiscal year basis. This is another delayed
 
13
 
COLA strategy estimated to save $40 billion between 1983-89.
 
B. Increasing Payroll Tax Rates
 
This strategy is already legislated for 5.7% (from 5.4%) in 1985 and
 
6.2% in 1990. The argument is for implementing these increases earlier
 
to affect the increase of short-term revenues without fundamentally
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altering the long-term tax rates. For example, according to the CBO,
 
implementing the January 1, 1985 rate increase on January 1, 1984 would
 
produce an estimated $6.4 billion of extra revenues in 1984, and $2.3 billion
 
in 1985; while moving the 1990 increase to 1984 would raise an estimated
 
14
 $97.6 billion between 1984-1988. The National Commission also recommended
 
that the 1985 and 1990 rates be revised. It estimated savings at $40
 
billion for such shifts between 1983-89.^^
 
The advantages include large receipt yields at the cost of relatively
 
small percentage increases for each worker, the lessened need for benefit
 
reductions which a priori will have an adverse effect on beneficiaries, and
 
the maintenance, of the present method of financing Social Security. The
 
disadvantages include increased tax burdens on workers, however modest
 
individually, which will add to 4 other payroll tax-rate hikes since 1977
 
to keep the system solvent, the real reduction in take-home pay that will
 
inevitably result, and the predicted adverse effect on the nation's economy
 
(i.e,, it is expected to raise labor costs, reduce employment and re-spark
 
16
 
inflationl,
 
C. Changing the Benefit Formula
 
The basic formula for initial Social Security benefits utilizes three
 
calculated quantities associated with a worker's Average Indexed Monthly
 
Earnings (or AIME, which is an adjusted measure of average monthly earnings
 
covering the years of eligible employment). 90% of the first $254 of the
 
worker's AIME, plus 32% of the. next $1274 of AIME., plus 15% of all AIME in
 
exbess. of $1528 equals a person's basic benefit. The argument for the rele
 
vant option is to adjust the first and last amounts (the percentage of
 
$254 and $1528) which, are called bend points. There is already an automatic
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upward adjustment of them based on the increase in overall average earnings
 
of American workers, and, according to the CBO, the argument is to adjust
 
them by 75% rather than 100%.^^ In the short-run, there would be an esti
 
mated $1.2 billion in savings for 1984-88, an amount not seemingly worth
 
the effort unless accompanied by other changes. For the long-run, this
 
type of adjustment, theoretically, would have more of a substantial
 
,. 18
 
impact.
 
Associated with this type of option is a variant of the strategy em
 
ployed in the recent legislation for reducing COLAs for younger retirees.
 
It argues for a lengthening of the AIME formula computation period by
 
three years—to age 65, rather than 62. It would lower early retiree
 
benefit levels, and would lessen incentives for early retirement, but
 
disproportionately affect disabled recipients even more adversely. It
 
would save an estimated $1.6 billion in the short-run during 1984-88, and
 
19
 
again not be worth the short-term effect alone.
 
See Table V-3 for a summary of the CBO across-the-board options and
 
their cost effects, and Table V-4 for a summary of the National Commission
 
recommendations.
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Targeted Reduction Options
 
A. According to the CBO, eliminating benefits for the children of early
 
retirees (ages 62-64) would produce an estimated $1.6 billion in cumulative
 
savings from 1984-88. Currently, the unmarried child of a retired worker
 
is categorically eligible for 50% of the amount of the retiree's basic^
 
benefit with certain restricted total amounts per family. Repealing that
 
would encourage later retirement and further reduce short-term outlays.
 
B, Tightejiing the family limit for OASI benefits by making it identical
 
to that for the more restrictive DI benefits for all new OASI beneficiaries
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TABLE. V-3; IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUNDS OF
 
ACROSS-THE-BOARD CHANGES a/(In billions of dollars)
 
Cumulative
 
Five-Year
 
Options	 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Savings
 
Short-Run COLA Reductions
 
Delay the COLA by
 
2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 10.4
Three Months
 
Cap the COLA at the
 
CPI Increase Minus
 
2 Percentage
 
4.2 7.8 11.5 15.3 19.1 57.9
Points Through 1988
 
Eliminate the 1983
 
6.8 6.9 6.9 6.7 6.4 =33.7
COLA
 
Eliminate the 1983
 
8.8 14.8 14.8 14.6 14.1 67.1
and 198^ COLAs
 
Short-Run Payroll Tax Rate Increases
 
Move 1985 Rate to
 
0	 8.7
2.3
danuary 198^	 6.4 

Move 1985 and 1990
 
19.3 19.4 18.3 19.6 21.0 97'.6
Rates to January 1984
 
Long-Run Changes
 
Restrict Increases in
 
Formula Bend Points
 
to 75 Percent of Wage
 5/ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.2

Increases
 
Lengthen Computation
 
b/ 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.6
Period by Three Years
 
a. 	 The impact of these options on the federal budget deficit may be
 
somewhat smaller than the trust fund effects shown here, due to
 
offsetting increases in spending for other federal programs or
 
reductions in federal tax receipts. For the options that would reduce
 
spending, only the effects on outlays are shown in this table, because
 
changes in budget authority (which includes interest) are uncertain
 
when trust fund balances are negative and declining.
 
b. 	 Less than $50 million.
 
SOURCE: CBO, Deficit '83, p. 72.
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TABLE 7-4: SUMMARY OF THE. NATIONAL COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS—
 
SHORT-RANGE AND LONG-RANGE COST ANALYSIS OF OASDI PROPOSALS
 
Short-Term Long-Range
 
Savings, Savings
 
1983-89 (percentage
 
(billions) of ^ payroll)
Proposal
 
+$20	 +.30%
Cover nonprofit and new Federal employees-S./
 
Prohibit withdrawal of State and local
 
—
govemnient employees +3
 
+.60
Taxation of benefits for higher-income persons +30
 
+.27
Shift COLAs to calendar-year basis +40
 
Eliminate windfall benefits for persons with
 
+.01
+.2
pensions from noncovered employment
 
Continue' benefits on remarriage for disabled
 
—
widow(er)s and for divorced widow(er)s	 -.1
 
Index deferred widow(er)'s benefits based on
 
-.2
wages (instead of CPI) -.05
 
Permit divorced aged spouse to receive benefits
 
-.1
when husband is eligible to receive benefits -.01
 
Increase benefit rate for disabled widow(er)s
 
aged 50-59 to 71^% of primary benefit -1 -.01
 
+.02
+40
Revise tax-rate schedule
 
+.19
Revise tax basis for self-employed +18
 
Reallocate OASDI tax rate between OASI and DI
 
Allow inter-fund borrowing from HI by OASDI
 
Credit the OASDI Trust Funds, by a lump-sum
 
payment 	for cost of gratuitous military service
 
—
+18
wage credits and past unnegotiated checks
 
Base automatic benefit increases on lower of CPI
 
or wage increases after 1987 if fund ratio is
 
under 20%, with catch-up if fund ratio
 
exceeds 32%
 
Increase delayed retirement credit from 3% per
 
year to 8%, beginning in 1990 and reaching
 
-.10^/
8% in 2010
 
—
Additional long-range changes-	 +.58
 
+1.80
+168
Total Effect
 
a/ 	 This cost estimate assumes that retirement patterns would be only slightly

~ ^ 	 affected by this change. If this change does result in significant changes
 
in retirement behavior over time, the cost increase would be less (or possibly
 
even a small savings could result).
 
b/ 	 Alternate methods for obtaining this long-range savings are presented in the
 
Additional Statements of the members (in Chapter 4).
 
c/ 	 Includes effect of revised tax schedule.
 
SOURCE; THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION, op. citl p. 2-5. In April, 1983,
 
all of the above recommendations were enacted into law with President Reagan^s
 
signing of the Social Security Reform Act. See Chapter VI for a discussion.
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would save an estimated $2,1 hillion dollars over 1984-1988.^^ It would
 
regressively affect lower benefit families, more adversely than higher bene
 
fit beneficiaries, but also bring benefits and earnings more in line with
 
each. Other.
 
C. Increasing the waiting period for DI benefits from five to six months
 
which returns the regulation to pre—1972, would save an estimated $1 billion
 
dollars during 1984-88. This too would be regressive, adversely affecting
 
the low-income disabled more, but administratively bring DI eligibility
 
into line with other Social Security and private disability plans.
 
D. Taxing 50% of Social Security benefits for families with incomes
 
exceeding $12,000 (single parent), or $18,000 (couples) would he similar
 
22
 
to the current state of UI benefit taxation. It would raise an esti
 
mated $29,7 billion over 1984-88 and could be targeted directly into the
 
trust funds. This is a far more progressive option than either B or C
 
above. It would reduce the disparities between Social Security benefits
 
and other pensions and in effect,, be similar to/'an income-targeted benefit
 
23
 
cut." It would also reduce or eliminate an incentive for early retire
 
ment since the current exemption for S,S, benefits increases their value
 
relative to earnings, and it would help lessen the* present disparity be
 
tween earnings/contributions and benefits (.usually well in excess of the
 
former).
 
E. Extending Social Security coverage to the 10% of job categories not
 
now participating would increase trust fund income. Present arguments are
 
to include federal civilian employees, state and local government employees,
 
and employees of nonprofit organizations. Although. 90% of all job cate
 
gories in America are now covered by Social Security, 90% of federal
 
civilian employees are not covered, 30% of state/local government employees
 
. ■ 24 
are not now covered and 20% of the. nonprofit employees.
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The CBO study indicates that adding all new federal civilian workers
 
and those with less than five years of employment into the Social Security
 
system would produce an estimated $12.6 billion dollars over the 1984-88
 
period. This can be added to the $6.7 billion estimated from requiring
 
the participation of non-profit employees, which is presently on a volun
 
tary basis. The National Commission estimates the savings to be $20 billion
 
for the 1983-89 period for adding both new federal employees and non-profit
 
workers into the Social Security system. Such a strategy would presumably
 
offer federal workers better disability and survivor protection than the
 
Civil Service Retirement system provides, and reduce the present inequity
 
of many federal workers benefiting from Social Security without signifi
 
cantly contributing earnings to it. However, one great obstacle to this
 
option is the necessity of fundamentally changing the CSR system to
 
25
 
implement it. For the non-profit employee participation, another major,
 
disadvantage would be possible labor cost increases and probable employee
 
reductions.
 
Adding state/local government employees would raise an estimated
 
$1.9 billion in revenues from 1984-88, according to the CBO. The National
 
Commission recommended that prohibiting the withdrawal of present local
 
and state employees on Social Security, and adding new ones, would raise
 
26
 
an estimated $3 billion. As with federal workers the disability and
 
survivors benefits are thought to be better, and, unlike most other pension
 
plans. Social Security is transferable from job to job. There will be
 
constitutional problems, however, in the federal government seeking to
 
collect the employers^ share of payroll taxes from state and local
 
governments. In addition, there may be greater state/local costs
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involved in the new arrangements, and in this day of fiscal crisis, they
 
27
 
will be very reluctant to agree to participate.
 
See Table V-5 for a summary of all of these options based on the CBO
 
study, and V-6 for another view of the National Commission's recommended
 
strategies.
 
II. Medicare and Medieaid
 
These two entitlement programs face continued pressure for undisciplined
 
expenditure growth for the rest of the 1980's principally because of the un
 
controlled growth in medical care costs, with the increase in the low-income,
 
elderly and disabled population only accounting for about 2% of that pro
 
blem. See Table V-7 for the CBO projections of federal outlays for.Medicare
 
and Medicaid. As already mentioned earlier in this thesis, the fiscal 1982
 
and 1983 expenditures would have been even higher except for the 1981 Recon
 
ciliation Act's cuts, particularly in federal payments for Medicaid. Medi
 
care costs were around 1% lower than what they would have been, and Medicaid
 
5%. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1982, (TEFRA) made addi
 
tional reductions, particularly in Medicare coverage, with savings estimated
 
at $11.3 billion (5.4% of projected outlays) in Medicare expenditures dur­
28
 ing 1983-85, and $1 billion (1.5%) in Medicaid. These reductions were
 
all either from changes in hospital reimbursements, or from other modifica
 
tions in federal and state benefit and payment policies - in effect, non­
structural program changes. Such will not bring Medicare and Medicaid
 
29
 
entitlement spending under control.
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TABLE V-5: IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUNDS
 
OFTARGETED STRATEGIES TO REDUCE SOCIAL
 
SECURITY BENEFITS a/(In billions of dollars)
 
Cumulative
 
Five-Year
 
Options 198^ 1985 1986 1987 1988 Savings
 
Eliminate Benefits
 
for Children of Early
 
Retirees • b/ 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.6
 
Tighten the Limit on
 
Family Benefits for
 
OASI Beneficiaries 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 2.1
0.8
 
Increase the Waiting
 
Period for DI Benefits
 
to Six Months	 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0
 
a. 	 The impact of- these options on the federal budget deficit may be
 
somewhat smaller than the trust fund effects shown here, due to
 
offsetting increases in spending for other federal programs or
 
reductions in federal tax receipts. For the options that would reduce
 
spending, only the effects on outlays are shown in this table, because
 
changes in budget authority (which includes interest) are uncertain
 
when trust fund balances are negative and declining.
 
b. 	 Less than $50 million.
 
Benefits for post-secondary school students between the ages of 18
 
and 22 are currently being phased out.
 
SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, 83, pp, 77, 80., 83, 	 (continued)
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TABIE Vr-S REVENUE GAINS FROM TARGETED STRATEGIES TO
 
(continued) INCREASE SOCIAL SECURITY i AXES(In billions
 
of dollars)
 
^ ^ ^ —
 
/ Cumulative
 
Five-Year
 
Options 198^^ 1985 1986 1987 1988 Increase
 
Tax 50 Percent of OASDI
 
Benefits for Families with
 
Total Incomes Above
 
$12,000 (Individuals)/
 
$18,000(Couples)
 
Trust fund revenues 1.7 5.8 6.6 7A 8.2 29.7
 
Unified budget revenues 1.7 5.8 6.6 7.^ 8.2 29.7
 
Increase Self-Employed Tax
 
Rate to Combined Employer-

Employee Rate and Allow
 
50 Percent of Payroll
 
Tax to Be Deductible
 
Trust fund revenues 0.9 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 12.9
 
Unified budget revenues 0.^ 1.3 1.^ 1.5 1.6 6.2
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TABLE V-5	 REVENUE GAINS FROM EXTENDING SOCIAL
 
SECURITY COVERAGE(In billions of dollars)
(continued)
 
Cumulative
 
Five-Year
 
1987 1988 Increase
1984 1985
Options	 1986
 
Cover Federal Civilian 
Workers with Fewer Than 
Five Years of Service 
Trust fund revenues I.I 1.9 2.6 
3.2 3.8 12.6 
Unified budget 
revenues a/ 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9 6.4 
Cover New State and
 
Local Government
 
Employees
 
0.7 1.9
0.4 0.5
O.I 0.2
Trust 	fund revenues
 
0.5 0.7 1.9
0.1 0.2 0.4
Unified budget revenues
 
Cover All Employees of
 
Nonprofit Organizations
 
1.8 2.1 6.7
0.9 1.3 1.6
Trust 	fund revenues
 
1.8 2.1 6.7
1.3 1.6
Unified budgeFrevenues 0.9
 
a.	 Estimate Is^as'ed on the assumption that the ®
 
would bemnaffected, so new federal employees would pay both Social
 
Security taxes and GSR contributions. Alternatively, " the
 
supplementary pension plan paralleled most private plans by requiring
 
no employee contribution, reductions in the federal deficit would be
 
much smaller and would primarily consist of employers-share pay-

merits from the Postal Service.
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TABLE V-6: 	 ESTIMATED IMPACT OF THE NATION. L v:CM\riSSION'5 PROPOSALS
 
ON OASDl TRUST FUNDS Un Diilions of
 
Total
 
1983 198^ 	 1983 1986 1987 1988 1983-1933
 
Trust Fund Outlay Reductions
 
Delay COLA from July .
 
to January
 1.7 3.8 	 ^.2 ^.3 ^.7 3.2 2^1. 1
 
Miscellaneous
 
Benefit Provisions a/
 0	 -0. 1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -O.L -1.3
 
Total Outlay Reduciions 1.7 3.7 ^.0 ^.3 ^.8 22.8
 
Trust Fund Income Increas^
 
Tax 30 Percent of
 
OASDI Benefits b/ 1.2 ^.2 ^.9 3.6
 6.^ 22.
 
Increase Payroll
 
Tax Rate 6.^ 2.3 0 0 10.3 
 19.0
 
Increase Self-Employed
 
Tax Rate
 1.0 3.0	 2.9 3.1 3.3 13.6
 
^.3 12.9
Extend Coverage c/	 1.0 1.9 2.3 3.2
 
Credit Trust Funds for
 
Military Wage Credits
 
and Reimbursement for
 
Uncashed Benefit
 
Checks 19.9 -0.3 -0.^' 'OA -0.1 -0.1 18.6
 
Total Income Increases 19.9 9.^ 11.1 9.9 11.8 2^.3 86.6
 
Total Reductions in
 
Outlays and Increases
 
in Income 21.6 13.1 13.1 1^.3 16.2 29.3 109.6
 
Estimated Increase in
 
Interest Income 0.3 2.9 3.8 6.8 8.3 28.3
 
Total Increase in
 
OASDI Trust Funds 21.9 16.0 1^.3 20.0 23.0 37.6 138.!
 
NOTE: 	Preliminary CBO estimates. Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
 
Negative numbers indicate outlay increases or revenue reductions.
 
a. 	 Provisions include increasing benefits for certain groups of widowed and divorced
 
persons, and decreasing benefits to persons with pensions from employment not
 
covered by Social Security.
 
b. 	 Estimate assumes that taxes on OASDI benefits would be phased in the same way as
 
are taxes on Unemployment Insurance benefits.
 
c. 	 Estimate includes effect of prohibiting the withdrawal of state and local
 
governments from Social Security.
 
SOURCE: CBO, 	Deficit, '83, p. 88.
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TABLEy-.7: federal OUTLAYS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAIO
 
(In billions of dollars)
 
Actual Estimated Baseline Proiection
 
Major Program 19S0 19S2 19S3 19SL 19S5 19S6 19S7 i9'iS
 
112. 1
85.2 98.7
57. I 65A 7^.0
35.0 50.^
Medicare
 
'66A 7^.7

^^03 ^9.7 57.3
2^,3 3^.9 38.9
Hospital Insurance
 
Supplementary
 
27.9 32T3- " 37.3
2^.5
18.2 21.1
10.7 15.6
Medical Insurance
 
31
26.2 28.7
19.^ 21.3 2^.1
l^.O 17.^
Medicaid
 
SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, 83, p, 9.8,
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Current Options
 
There are two principal categories of current strategy for hetter con
 
trolling Medicare/Medicald costs: a continuation of the progrannnatlc
 
approach (I.e., cosmetic changes In benefit regulations and reimbursement
 
policies), and a structural approacb to enact legislation, "aimed at the
 
30 , ^ .
 
medical care system as a whole," The programmatic options Include In
 
creased beneficiary cost sharing, prospective hospital reimbursement and
 
31
 
changes In physician reimbursement. See Table y-^8 for the CBl) cost projecr..
 
tlons associated with tbese options.
 
The structural approacb Is thus far concentrated on encouraging market
 
place competition In the medical care field, and Increased government regu
 
lation of medical care. Currently there Is little of either, and under
 
the present administration more government regulation of such a vast Industry
 
as medical care Is highly Improbable, At least one federal resource capable of
 
initiating such competition is the current tax subsidy for employer-paid
 
health Insurance for employees. Currently employers get a tax break by con
 
verting some employee compensation to health Insurance as opposed to employee
 
cash payments. Repeal of this tax subsidy would fuel an Increased utiliza
 
tion of employer—employee cost sharing plans and market searchas for cost
 
containment plans. In addition, there Is an Increasing advocacy for greater
 
usage of Health Maintenance Organizations as health care providers, and
 
Instituting larger beneficiary deductlbles and more use of coinsurance
 
arrangements to spur marketplace competition.
 
Regulation would, for the most part. Involve more government control
 
of payments to health care delivery systems and a standardization, of types
 
and costs of patient services. An example of such standardization woiild be
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TABLE BUDGET SAVINGS FROM PROGRAM CHANGES IN
 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID (In millions of dollars)
 
Options
 
Medicare
 
Increase Beneficiary
 
Cost-Sharing
 
Expand Hospital
 
Coinsurance
 
Days 2-30 a/ •
 
Budget Authority 

Outlays 

Expand Hospital
 
Coinsurance
 
with Cap on
 
Out-of-Pocket
 
Costs for Some a/
 
Budget Authority
 
Outlays
 
Increase SMI
 
Premiums a/
 
Budget Authority
 
Outlays
 
Increase SMI
 
Premiums for
 
High-Income
 
Families Only
 
Budget Authority
 
Outlays
 
Tax the Premiums
 
for Supplemental
 
Coverage b/ 

198^ 

-190
 
1,980
 
-70
 
1,190
 
900
 
900
 
2i;0
 
290
 
2,390
 
1985
 
-520 

3,010 

-290
 
1,820
 
1,120
 
1, 120
 
300
 
300
 
3,610 

1986
 
-800 

3,900 

-900
 
2,050
 
1,700
 
1,700
 
950
 
950.
 
9,160 

Cum u!a tive
 
Five-Year
 
1987 1988 Savin-^s
 
-1,070 --1,370 -3,950
 
3,820 " 9,290 16,990
 
-550 -720 -1,980
 
2,320 2,610 9,990
 
2,960 3,370 9,550
 
2,960* 3,370 9,550
 
650 890 2,530
 
650 890 2,530
 
9,820 5,970 20,950
 
SOURCE: CBO, Deficit,83, pp. 104-105. (continued)
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TABLE V-8 (continued) 	 Cumulative
 
Five-Year
 
Options 	 198^ 1985 1986 1987 1988 Savings
 
Move to Prospective
 
Hospital
 
Reimbursement
 
Replace Reimburse
 
ment Limits in
 
TEFRA with
 
Prospective
 
Reimbursement
 
Budget Authority -- -- -80 -300 -580 -960
 
Outlays 	 — 2,1^0 ^,100 ^,610 10,850
 
Change Physician
 
Reimbursement
 
Limit Reasonable
 
Charge Growth
 
Budget Authority ^0 260 670 1,200 1,830 ^,000
 
Outlays 10 190 590 1,100 1,730 3,620
 
Adopt Fee Schedules
 
for Surgical
 
Procedures
 
Budget Authority 170 700 810 9^0 1,100 3,720
 
Outlays ISO 680 790 920 1,070 3,6^0
 
Medicaid
 
Extend Cuts in
 
Matching Grants
 
for Medicaid
 
Budget Authority -- 870 660 8^0 1 ,0^0 3,^10
 
Outlays 	 -- S70 660 . 8^0 1 ,0^0 3,^10
 
a. 	 Savings estimates reflect the concurrent increase in federal Medicaid
 
expenditures.
 
b. 	 Savings are a combination of outlay reductions and revenue increases.
 
„ B..u.dget authority estimates are not available.
 
--The Social Security Reform Act, 1983, contained an enactment of some
 
provisions which call for a fundamental change in the reimbursement
 
procedures for beneficiary care and cost containment. See Chapter
 
VI 	for a further discussion.
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mandating a prospective rather than retrospecttye reimbursement policy for
 
all providers of medical care payments. Such, would force hospitals to
 
attempt to limit their currently unrestrained expansion in costs. This
 
strategy is already being demonstrated in 7 states which have instituted
 
hospital cost control policies. Their combined growth in 1976-81 in-patient
 
expenses is 11%/year as compared to 14% in states without hospital cost
 
control programs. Regulation could also entail a standardization of phy
 
sicians- fees and the establishment of federal health care planning guide
 
lines.. The former is already being successfully done in other countries.
 
More of this type of structural solution should be actively pursued to
 
contain entitlement spending in the medical field.
 
III. Other Entitlement Programs
 
The heavyweights of "uncontrollability" in entitlements are Social Security,
 
Medicare/Medicaid and currently, unemployment compensation. All three require
 
heavy outlay commitments from the budget even without indexation, just be
 
cause of the nature of their program goals and scope. Excluding the agri
 
cultural entitlements, and interest on the public debt, the rest of the en
 
titlement programs have undisciplined increases only insofar as indexation,
 
program interaction, and numbers of beneficiaries affect the steady growth
 
of their funding needs and their combined, overall numbers. Individually,
 
these programs do not require huge federal outlay commitments. In spite of
 
that, these programs, most especially the means^tested individual assistance
 
categories, sustained the bulk of the highly publicized 1981 Reconciliation
 
Act budget cuts. Reductions ranging from 10-20% of CBO estimated outlays
 
were implemented in all of the means-tested programs other than SSI and
 
Veterans' Pensions, and in the Guaranteed Student Loan program, child
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nutrition, UI, Trade Adjustment Assistance and Title XX Social Services,
 
as mentioned earlier in this thesis. Additionally, the 0MB continued to
 
view the problem of control of entitlements as correctable through annual
 
reductions in benefits from most of the same programs, especially the means­
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tested entitlements. Thus, most of its fiscal 1983 and 1984 proposals to
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reduce federal entitlement spending were aimed at^ these programs.
 
This section discusses the current options to either generate more revenue
 
for the above mentioned"other" entitlement programs or to reduce their outlays,
 
As the Tables V-9 and V-10 show, there is little projected growth in
 
these programs during the rest of the 1980's, assuming unemployment and
 
inflation significantly decline. Such projections do not depend on any of
 
the options to be discussed here, but instead provide projections demon
 
strating there is a pattern of expenditure stability already being developed,
 
■ ■ ■ ■ 
and suggests that at least some of the 1981 cuts were definite overkill.
 
The options discussed in this section - some structural, some cosmetic - can
 
significantly aid the accuracy of the projections in the tables. They, in
 
addition, further demonstrate that Congress can definitely control some en
 
titlements, particularly with structural changes. However, the essence of
 
Congress' problems with entitlement uncontrollables has never been with
 
most of the entitlements discussed in this section, but with the entitle
 
ment heavyweights. Only through structural strategies can that essential
 
problem be effectively dealt with.
 
Current Options
 
There are five major options presently being considered to control effec^
 
tively the entitlements relevant to this section: modifying and adjusting
 
federal pension structures, providing additional trust fund revenues taxing
 
certain program benefits, more efficiently targeting program aid to those
 
most in need of it, and resolving program redundancies.
 
A. Restructuring military retirement benefits has become a rather consis
 
tent argument recently. These benefits cost $15 million in 1982, and pre
 
sently this system offers substantial cash payments for those retirees with
 
20 or more years of service, but virtually no benefits for nondisabled
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TABXE V-g: FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR "OTHER ENTITLE.StENT" PROGRAMS 
(In billions of dollars) 
Major Program 
Actual 
19S0 1982 
Estimated 
1983 198^ 
Easeiine Projection 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
Benefits for Individuals 
Non-Means-Tested Programs 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Trade Adjustment 
Assistance 
"Veterans' Compensation 
^ Black Lung 
Railroad Retirement b/ 
16.9 
1.7 
7.9 
1.8 
9.7 
29.3 
0.1 
9.3 
2.0 
3.3 
33.0 
0.1 
9.9 
1.8 
3.7 
27.8 
0.1 
10.2 
1.8 
3.9 
26.5 
a/ 
10.6 
1.8 
6.0 
26.1 
a/ 
10.9 
1.8 
6.2 
25.9 
a/ 
11.2 
1.8 
6.3 
23.6 
a/ 
11.3 
1.8 
6.9 ' 
: 
Means-Tested Programs 
AFDC c/ 
SSI d/ 
Veterans' Pensions 
Food Stamps e/ 
7.3 
6.9 
3.6 
9.1 
8.0 
7.7 
3.9 
11.0 
8.1 
8.6 
3.8 
12.9 
8.9 
7.9 
3.7 
12.2 
8.3 
8.1 
-3.7 
1273 
8\S 
8.9 
3.6 
13.1 
9.1 
8.6 
3.3 
13.3 
9.3 
9.6 
3.3 
13.8 
^ 
; 
Partially Means-Tested 
Programs 
Guaranteed Student 
Loans	 I 3.0
 2..5 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.3
 
Child Nutrition ^.7 ^.6 ^.9 3.2 3.7
5A 6.0
 
Public Service Grants for
 
States and Localities
 
General Revenue
 
Sharing 6.9 9.6 9.6, 9.7 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.7
 
Title XX Social
 
Services 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7
 
Total	 73.3 87.9 97.6 92.2 93.9 93.0 96.9
 
a. Less than $30 million.
 
b. About 60 percent of outlays for Railroad Retirement provide Social Security benefits for
 
retired railroad workers.
 
c.
 AFDC estimates include the Child Support Enforcement program.
 
d. Fiscal years 1983 and 1988 include 13 months of benefits; fiscal year 1989 includes
 
months.
 
e. Estimates include nutrition assistance for Puerto Rico.
 
f. 	 These programs, while partially means-tested, do serve some higher-income households.
 
SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, ^83, p. 118.
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TARTF XZ-tO' budgetary OUTLAYS AND RECEIPTS FOR FEDERAL
 
CIVILIAN COMPENSATION (In billions of dollars)
 
Actual Estimated Baseline Projection
 
Major Program 1980 1982 1983 198^ 1983 1986 1987 1988
 
Gross Outlays
 
Pay 31.0 33.2 36.1 39.0 61.9 6^.9 68.1
 
Civil Service
 
Retirement 1^.7 19.3 21.2 22.8 2^.4 26.^ 28.3 30.2
 
Other
 
Benefits ^.9 6.6 8.3 10.] 12.] 1^.3 17.0 20.2
 
Total 614.0 77.1 82.7 89.0 93.3 102.6 110.2 118.3
 
Receipts and Collections
 
Civil Service
 
Retirement 3.2 3.8 6.0 6.2 7.0 7.3 7.7 8.0
 
Other
 
Benefits 2.14 3.6 i4.t4 3.^ 6.t4 7.6 9.0 10.7
 
Total Offsets 7.6 9.(4 10.^ 11.6 13.^ 13.1 16.7 18.7
 
Net Budget Impvact
 
Total 36.i 67.7 72.3 77.i4 82.1 87.3 93.3 99.
 
a. Includes group health plans, life insurance, and workers'compensation.
 
b. Includes-contributions from federal employees and off-budget agencies, which represent
 
federal revenues and offsetting receipts, respectively.
 
SOURCE: Ibid, p. 187.
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retirees with less than the 20 years.
 
The one-half COLA adjustment for younger retirees through 1985, pre
 
viously mentioned, was one general response to this argument. Other
 
options would include: (a) making that half-COLA adjustment permanent, (b)
 
providing a single catch-up annuity adjustment for military retirees once
 
they reach 62 to partially compensate for any inequities caused by this
 
permanent change, (c) providing some selected benefits for 62-year-old
 
retirees with at least 10 years of service, and (d) basing retirement
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benefits on a retirees' three highest pay years. Combined, these other
 
options would save an estimated $1.9 billion between 1984-88. Advantages
 
of these combined effects would include improving military personnel manage
 
ment efficiency, increasing the retention of non-senior career staff, and
 
discouraging early retirement while achieving the above savings. Disadvan
 
tages include a substantial risk of damaging the morale of active duty
 
personnel and motivating a compensatory increase in reenlistment bonuses
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and other special outlays.
 
For reducing retirement costs for federal civilian personnel there are
 
three major strategies currently under consideration: modification of Civil
 
Service Retirement benefits for all new retirees, instituting fixed-rate
 
individual retirement plans for all new employees, and rescinding the over­
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compensation for pre-1977 retirees.
 
Benefits can be modified by gradually reducing the earned amount for
 
pre-65 retirees no matter what their length of service. Currently retirees
 
are eligible for full benefits at 55 with 30 years of service, or at 60,
 
with 20 years. Another such reduction device is the gradual institutioni­
zation of calculating a retiree's benefit levels from averaging his 5
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highest earnings years rather than his 3 highest years as is presently
 
done. Benefits can also be modified by changing the formula for survivor's
 
benefits to incorporate retiree age variations, and by limiting COLAs for
 
both new and current beneficiaries to 33% of the CPI for retirees young
 
er than 62, and 70% for those 62 and older. Together these options can
 
account for an estimated $1.7 billion in budget authority savings be­
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tween 1984-88, and nearly $6 billion in outlays (see Table V-11).
 
Using a fixed-rate plan would solve one of the vexing dilemmas of
 
pension plans — the costs of the pensions usually far exceeding the
 
combined employer/employee contributions to them. Currently the
 
difference is paid through government appropriations. Under a fixed-

rate plan, agency contributions would be raised to a specified level
 
and separated from employee contributions into interest-bearing accounts
 
(e.g. U.S. Treasury Securities) applicable to new employees only.
 
The full government appropriations contribution would then be restricted
 
to employees with a minimtim time of participation in the fixed-rate
 
system (e.g., 5 years, 10 years, etc.). Besides the balancing of contri
 
butions to benefits, fixed-rate plans encourage the decline of short
 
term and before-age-62 employees from withdrawing their benefits/
 
contributions on the one hand, as opposed to accepting a deferred
 
annuity beginning at age 62, thus increasing the number and percentage
 
of retirees to receive government annuities. On the other hand is the
 
reduction of both the costs of government contributions as a percent of
 
employee payrolls and the actual benefits accruing to career employees.
 
Concerning pension overcompensation for pre-1977 retirees, between
 
1970-1976, the COLAs for the CSR system were legislated to include 101%
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TABLE V-11: BUDGET SAVINGS FROM STRATEGIES TO
 
REDUCE PAY AND PENSIONS FOR FEDERAL
 
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES(In billions of dollars)
 
Options 1984 1985 1986 1987 

Freeze 1984 Pay and
 
Pension Adjustments
 
Budget Authority 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.6 

Outlays 2.9 4.0 4.2 4.4 

Modify CSR Benefits
 
Budget Authority -- 0.2 0.4 0.5 

Outlays 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.7 

Revamp CSR"System
 
Budget Authority -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 

Outlays 0-1 *9.2 0.3 

Adjust Certain CSR
 
Annuities for Past
 
Overcompensation
 
Budget Authority — 0.1 0.2 0.3 

Outlavs 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 

NOTE: Totals may not add because of rounding.
 
SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, '83, p.. 191.,
 
Cumulative
 
Five-Year
 
1988 Savings
 
3.8 17.1
 
4.6 20.0
 
0.7 1.7
 
2.3 5.9
 
-0.9 -2.5
 
0.3 0.9
 
0.4 1.0
 
1.0 2.6
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of the changes in the CPI. Effective 1977, that additional 1% adjustment
 
was rescinded but not retroactively. The strategy for correcting this
 
and associated imbalances(short of a direct retroactive rescission) calls
 
for a temporary reduction of such COLAs to \ the changes in the CPI until
 
the affected benefits are in line with current retirement provisions.
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The estimated savings by 1988 will be $1 billion.
 
B. Additional trust fund revenues can be generated by expanding the
 
tax base of trust fund programs, especially U.I. This social insur
 
ance program has recently been teetering on insolvency due to the com
 
bined impacts of the 1973-75, 1980, and present recessions. To
 
counter this trend, the current $7,000 unemployment payroll tax base
 
per employee could be tied to increases in the national average wages
 
earned similar to the present practice employed with the tax base for
 
Social Security. This would be opposed to the current practice of
 
allowing U.I. benefits to rise based on a beneficiary's prior earnings
 
and other adjustments, while the U.I. tax base remains moribund and
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out of synct. This strategy could generate an estimated $900 million
 
in increased revenues in 1984 alone, and $15 billion between 1984—88,
 
generally cause revenues to increase as benefits do, and aid in the
 
long term solvency and stability of the system. A major disadvantage
 
could be the added increase in unemplojmient resultant from the expanded
 
A3
 
costs of labor associated with increasing the payroll tax base.
 
C. A supplementary revenue-generating source is applying a tax to
 
selected program benefits. This was mentioned previously for Social
 
Security benefits and is currently under consideration for U.I. benefits,
 
Railroad Retirement, Veterans' and Workers' Compensations benefits via
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federal income taxes. The revenues raised can then be earmarked for
 
the specific trust funds whose programs were responsible for the in
 
creased individual income leading to the federal tax.
 
Taxing benefits would mainly be applicable to the social insurance
 
programs, not the means-tested programs. U.I. benefits, for example,
 
as previously mentioned, are already included in taxable income above
 
$12,000 for individuals and $18,000 for couples. The currently pro
 
posed strategy argues for taxing all U.I. benefits in order to more com
 
prehensively include incomes marginal to these thresholds. It is
 
estimated that $6.6 billion in additional revenues in the years 1984-88,
 
would result from this procedure, in spite of criticisms that this would
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increase the tax liabilities of moderate and low-income beneficiaries.
 
Taxing 40% of Railroad Retirement benefits is aimed at decreasing
 
the federal contribution to the program and resolving some of the contrasts
 
between these benefits and private pension programs. Currently the
 
R.R.S. receives worker contributions from over 400,000 employees and
 
services over 1 million beneficiaries. Though technically a private
 
pension fund, the R.R.S. iS administered by the federal government, has
 
some of its coverage overlapped with. Social Security, and its benefits
 
are tax free. The current strategy argues for taxing that portion
 
of R.R.S. benefits which exceed the worker contributions and that are
 
not substitutes for Social Security Income. Revenue generation from
 
this strategy is estimated at $500 million in 1984 alone and $3.6 billion
 
in 1984-88, and achieving these amounts would not regressively harm
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lower income beneficiaries.
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Veterans' Compensation benefits are also not now taxed. They are
 
paid regatdless of income, from other sources to veterans eligible for
 
service—related disabilities and range from $62/month, for a 10% dis
 
ability to $1213/ month, for complete disability, plus other adjustments.
 
Taxing such benefits would be aimed at those veterans most able to
 
afford the added tax liability and would theoretically raise $1.1 billion
 
in 19.84, and $8.4 billiojj during 1984-88.
 
Taxing Workers' Compensation benefits is aimed at the income loss
 
payments, not the medical expenses category of this program. About
 
70% of workers' compensation payments are such income loss supplements
 
whose amounts vary state-to-state. Advantages include eliminating the
 
differences between the incomes of beneficiaries, and, the wages earned
 
and taxed by a 'healthy' worker, and reducing the disincentive of dis
 
abled workers receiving income supplements to teturn to work as quickly
 
as. they are able. Disadvantages include increased hardship in states/
 
regions with lower disability rates and the discrepancy that would be
 
established between tax-free court ordered disability compensation and
 
taxejd federal disability. It would raise an estimated $13,5 billion
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during 1984-88.
 
D, Better targeting of aid to the neediest beneficiaries is a method
 
of achieving outlay-savings rather than raising revenue. It was proven
 
effective with the 19.81 Reconciliation Act's impact on the majority of
 
the means-tested programs, and is currently being considered for other
 
entitlements such as the Guaranteed Student Loans, Child Nutrition,
 
General Revenue Sharing and Veterans Compensation programs.
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The major targeting strategy for the G.S.L. is the elimination of
 
the federal in-school interest subsidy allowed students in the professions.
 
Such students would be required to pay their own loan interests since
 
their future high-income employment is more readily assumed. This
 
would not save much — only $500 million during 1984—88, — and may
 
make the G.S.L. arrangements too complicated for many lenders to con
 
tinue participation in the program.
 
For Child Nutrition, the strategy is to eliminate the federal re
 
imbursement for meals provided to non-poor children, particularly those
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from families with incomes at or above 185% of the poverty line. An
 
added advantage of this strategy, if it is one, is that a number of schools
 
would drop the Child Nutrition program as a direct result of this strategy:
 
some because it would decrease significantly the number of their enrollees
 
participating in the program, and others because required reporting re
 
gulations would become too onerous. The estimated savings would be $270
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million for 1984, and $1.5 billion cumulative for 1984-88.
 
General revenue sharing, which currently provides unrestricted
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federal grants to counties, cities, and townships, could be further
 
limited to only local governments which demonstrate high fiscal stress
 
with low fiscal capacity. The argument for this strategy is aimed at
 
structurally eliminating the categorical entitlement of local governments
 
viz-a-viz general revenue sharing, even though any added reduction in
 
federal grants to local governments at this time, well-off or not, may
 
severely cripple these government efforts to provide citizen services.
 
The expected estimated savings if this option is enacted would be $1.1.
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billion in 1984, and $7.6 billion during 1984-88.
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Thfi strategy optton concerning Veterans' Compensation is to repeal
 
legislation allowing cash, payments to certain veterans with 30%
 
or less disability, and retaining their health^medical benefits
 
allowance. Additionally, there is an argument to eliminate the
 
allowances for dependents of veterans with, less than 50% disability.
 
For the first strategy, expected savings are $1.8 billion in 1984,
 
and $10.7 billion during 19-84-88. For the accompanying strategy,
 
there would be an estimated 19.84 savings of $135 million. The major
 
advantage of th.ese two options, besides the. money, are supposedly that
 
they would induce vate.rans who can work, to seek, it, further reducing
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the federal government's financial res.ponsibli.ty,
 
E, The final major option is to eliminate or reduce federal program
 
redundancies and inconsistencies. One corollary of this option is the
 
termination of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program entirely, and
 
it is contained in the current budget proposals for fiscal 1984.
 
It would save only an estimated $5Q million dollars for 1984. Another
 
corollary would be the reduction of special allowances to G.S.L, lenders,
 
aimed at gradually reducing the lenders' yields to comparability with
 
Other market rates. It would save an estimated $3Q0 million during 1984­
88. A third corollary would be COLA, delays for SSI and veterans
 
programs, similar to the COLA delays for Social Security. They would save
 
an estimated $80.0 millioih in 1984.
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IV. The Farm Support Options
 
Federal outlays for the farm price support system was $11.6 billion
 
in 1982, three times higher than in 1981. For 1983, outlays are esti
 
mated at nearly $18 billion, and projected to average over $6 billion
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through 1984-88 (see Table V-12). International economic conditions,
 
which are Out of this country's capacity to control, have a great deal
 
to do with those numbers. The government provides eligible farmers
 
price support loans, purchases and direct cash pa3niients to compensate
 
for low farm prices mainly resultant from large crop yields, a weak
 
world economy , and declining domestic consumption of milk products.
 
The current strategies to reduce government expenditures for these pro
 
grams were previously discussed in terms of the 1982 Reconciliation Act.
 
In this section, the additional strategy options for further reducing
 
government costs and restricting crop production for the future are
 
reported.
 
The two major federal support reduction strategies are eliminating
 
deficiency payments and capping the farmer-owned reserve level. Both
 
options would save money but at the expense of significantly reducing
 
the income for the farmers the programs are supposed to protect. De
 
ficiency payments, for example, are government support payments for
 
high export-crops — wheat, feed grains, upland cotton and rice. Be­
tweeen 1974-80, approximately 2.5 billion in such payments were made,
 
$1.2 billion in 1981, and approximately $1.5 billion will be paid in
 
1982-83.^^ Eliminating them would save an estimated.$5.5 billion be
 
tween 1984-85. It is hoped that the few small farmers who benefit from
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FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRICE
 
SUPPORT PROGRAMS(In billions of dollars)
 
Actual Estimated Baseline Projection
 
Major Program 1980 1982 1983 198^ 1985 1986 1987 1988
 
Wheat 0.9 2.2 ^.1 2.0 1.^ 0.7 0.8 0.5
 
Feed Grains 1.3 6A 6.1 3.1 2.6 1.5 1.3 1.1
 
Rice -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.^ 0.3 0.3 0,k
 
Upland Cotton 0.1 1.2 1.3 1.^ 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.5
 
Tobacco -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
 
Peanuts i/ ay
i/
 
Dairy 1.0 2.2 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.9
 
All Other -0.^ 0.3 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5
 
Total 2.7 11.6 17.6 9.0 7.^ k.5 1^.7 ^.9
 
NOTE: 	Commodity program outlays shown in the above table are CBO baseline outlays. They
 
are rounded to the nearest $100 million. A minus sign indicates a net receipt. This
 
baseline does not reflect the implementation of the payments-in-kind program but does
 
assume acreage control programs in effect during fiscal years 198^-1988 and assess
 
ments on milk marketings in fiscal years 1983-1987.*
 
a. Indicates outlays less than $50 million.
 
SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, '83, p. 135.
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these payments will be cushioned by offsetting payments from other
 
commodity programs, but that is not at all certain. Fortunately, the
 
bulk of these deficiency payments are made to large farmers and agri
 
business producers, and thus they could probably survive the elimination
 
of those payments.
 
The farmer-owner reserve is a stockpiling of certain crop commodities
 
originally established to both help farmers stretch out their marketing
 
periods during years of over-production, and to help consumers avoid
 
abrupt food shortages and higher prices. At present approximately 3.5
 
billion bushels of wheat and feed grains are in the reserve at an annual
 
storage cost of $0.6 billion. Capping this reserve system means prohi
 
biting another 600 million bushels of 1982-83 wheats and grains from
 
being stored, with an estimated outlay savings of $1.8 billion for the
 
two years combined, before the offsetting costs of farmers taking out in
 
creased non-recourse loans and then forfeiting their crops to the govern­
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ment. The end estimated savings will be closer to $210 million for both
 
years combined, making this option seem like an exercise in futility.
 
Farmers will lose income and the government will gain little budgetary
 
savings.
 
Concerning the restriction of crop production, under current law the
 
government can and does withhold payments to farmers who refuse to cut
 
back on the percentage of designated acreage planted. It also pays farmers
 
to divert designated acreage to other production. Both of these tactics
 
are currently in use for 1982-83 crops in order to reduce overall crop
 
production, increase farm prices and decrease the government's outlays
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for price supports. The future strategy is mandatory acreage reduction
 
since the present system is voluntary, wasteful, and inefficient. Farmers
 
reduce only their least productive acreage usually, then find various
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other ways of receiving the benefits but still doing basically what
 
they want. Under mandatory divert and reduce rules up to 25% of
 
government designated acreage from each participating farmer would
 
be affected. This would require specific congressional legislation, but
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is estimated to save $5,9 billion in 1984-85, if enacted. This policy
 
option would also mean a major, albeit temporary, increase in govern
 
ment intervention into the farming industry. Under the present ad
 
ministration, this is unlikely (see Table V-13).
 
Other reductionist strategies include eliminating the wool and mohair
 
program, eliminating the honey-price support program, and putting the
 
peanut program on a no net—cost basis. Together these terminations
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are estimated to save $794 million dollars between 1984-88. How
 
ever, this savings will be at the expense of also reducing farmer incomes
 
with little other positive program interaction (see Table V-14).
 
Can Congress control entitlements other than the heavyweights and
 
interest on the public debt? Yes, if it is willing to enact structural
 
change legislation, including indexation adjustments, better targeting
 
of beneficiaries, control program interaction, and make other efforts.
 
However, the cost of such congressional action may be intolerably high
 
if the very nature of the programs are changed and the beneficiaries
 
are inordinately harmed.
 
Can the Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid entitlement spending
 
be controlled? Yes, but only to a relative degree without structural
 
reforms of their programs within the budget process. As long as, for example.
 
Social Security funding is automatically tied to indexation, the accom
 
panying inevitable rise in the number of beneficiaries will continue to
 
cause grand increases in Social Security outlays and obligations. All three
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TABLE V-13: 	BUDGET SAVINGS FROM BROAD REDUCTION
 
STRATEGIES IN AGRICULTURAL PRICE
 
SUPPORT PROGRAMS(In billions of dollars)
 
Cumulative
 
Five-Year
 
Strategy 	 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Savings
 
Reducing the Level
 
of Federal Support
 
Eliminate Defi
 
ciency Payments
 
Budget Authority -- -- 1,935 3,540 3,580 9,055
 
Outlays 1,935 3,540 3,580 3,380 3,065 , 15,500
 
Cap the Farmer-

Owned Reserve "
 
Budget Authority -- -- 110 — -- 110
 
Outlays 110 -- __ __ __ no
 
Reduce the Level
 
of Dairy Price
 
Support ay
 
Budget Authority — -- -985 -290 60 -1,215
 
Outlays -985 -290 60 200 1,135 120
 
Restricting Crop
 
Production
 
Budget Authority -- -- 450 5,490 1,660 7,600
 
Outlays 450 5,490 1,660 1,485 985 ' 10,070
 
a. Minus sign indicates an increase as compared with the baseline.
 
SOURCE: CBG, Deficit, '-83, p.140.
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TABLE V-14: BUDGET SAVINGS FROM TARGETED REDUCTION
 
STRATEGIES IN AGRICULTURAL PRICE
 
SUPPORT PROGRAMS(In millions of dollars)
 
Options 1984 1985 1986 1987 '1988
 
Eliminate the Wool
 
and Mohair Program
 
Budget Authority 65 76 85 92
 
Outlays 65 76 85 92 96
 
Eliminate the Honey
 
Price Support Program
 
Budget Authority 33 36 38
 
Outlays 33 36 38 40 41
 
Place the Peanut
 
Program on a
 
No-Net-Cost Basis
 
Budget Authority 38 38 38
 
Outlays 38 38 38 38 38
 
SOURCE: CBO,Deficit,^83, p. 145.
 
Cumulative
 
Five-Year
 
Savings
 
318
 
414
 
107
 
188
 
114
 
190
 
-106­
of these large entitlements remain too dependent on the ebb and flow of
 
the economy and the fluctuations in the cost of living for other than
 
undisciplined expenditure increases to continue in both the short and long
 
runs. Unfortunately, the majority of the current strategies considered
 
here seek essentially cosmetic changes—singularly or in combination—
 
in these programs, rather than confronting the basic structures of the
 
Social Security and health care systems in this country. All of the
 
available evidence indicates these entitlements will continue to grow
 
unrestrained in the future (if they do not become insolvent first) with
 
out fundamental structural revisions in their makeup.
 
As shovm by the discussion of the present and immediate^future strategies
 
now being considered for controlling entitlement spending, individually
 
each program can have modifications implemented which will result in some
 
savings, based on either optimistic or pessimistic economic assumptions.
 
However, in almost all cases (the entitlement heavyweights and others) the
 
growth rate of spending for the programs are barely affected, and entitle
 
ment spending overall does not reverse its long-term expansion with the
 
non-structural strategies suggested. Even the structural alterations will
 
have difficulty effecting control for Congress over entitlement spending
 
because of the present unpredictabilities and uncertainties inherent in
 
our economic system. But the structural changes through the budgetary
 
process offer the only viable probability now and for the future for
 
Congress to gain the fiscal control they currently lack over entitlement
 
spending.
 
CHAPTER VI; CONCLUSIONS
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On April 20, 1983, President Reagan signed into law PL 98-21,. the
 
1
 
Social Security Reform Act. The legislation contained all of the recom
 
mendations previously issued by the National Commission on Social Se
 
curity Reform, plus a few congressional additions, including a fundamen
 
tal change in the retirement age from 65 to 67 by the year 2027, and a
 
new accounting arrangement with the general Treasury. The bulk of the
 
Act's provisions are intended to raise revenues and broaden the base
 
of Social Security participation so that the system is kept solvent for
 
the short-term, and is re-established for the long-term.
 
None of the more radical structural options discussed in Chapter V
 
for controlling Social Security expenditures—eliminating the 1983-84
 
COLAS, or freezing them through 1988, for example—was enacted in the
 
reform legislation, since the aim was to save the system, not reduce
 
spending for it. But in spite of that, some of the enacted changes were
 
fundamental, structural transformations in benefit levels, age require­
2
 
ments, and eligibility characteristics. Because of that and the fact
 
that some of the Act's provisions will result in benefit cuts for reti
 
rees and, in effect, small cuts in future Social Security outlays, a
 
cogent argument can be made that the Reform Act was at least an effective
 
beginning to the establishment of governmental control of the future
 
growth of Social Security spending. These fundamental changes include
 
taxing one-half of the benefits for higher-income recipients, which while
 
primarily aimed at the approximately 40% of the Social Security elderly
 
who currently pay income taxes, will eventually affect the vast majority
 
of Social Security beneficiaries who receive other income. They also in
 
clude eliminating the windfall benefits accruing to workers who participate
 
in the Social Security system for only a short time, the changing of the
 
retirement age previously mentioned, and broadening the base of mandatory
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participation in the system (rather than voluntary, as it had been ) to
 
all new federal workers, all members of Congress, the president and vice-

president, and all federal judges. All of these, plus the permanent shift
 
of the COLA benefit to January, will produce outlay savings (see pages
 
77, 82-84 in the text), some primarily for the short-term (the next 5-7
 
years), and some, like the taxing of higher-income recipients, for the
 
long-term.
 
Coupled with the Act's stipulations for mandatory participation in the
 
Social Security system by the approximately 1 million non-profit organi
 
zation employees, the prohibition of state and local government employees
 
from withdrawing from the system, and the new accounting procedure with
 
the general Treasury—all virtually guaranteeing consistent increases in
 
the trust fund revenue base—Social Security expenditures have at least
 
been made more controllable , if not more controlled. Given the context
 
and the vigor of the political fight which was necessary to achieve even
 
these relatively mild, but very important changes in the Social Security
 
system, the Reform Act can be seen as one small but positive step—
 
perhaps the first stage of a longer process— in the direction of con
 
trolling spending for the biggest entitlement program of all.
 
The Reagan administration seems convinced, if but few others are,
 
that the reforms, at least the ones based solely on the commission's
 
recommendations, will help in the struggle to discipline entitlement
 
spending. Tables VI-1 and VI-2 show the administration's projections
 
(based on the assumptions shown in Chapter V) for future entitlement
 
expenditures, and the effect on Social Security spending of implementing
 
the commission's recommendations.
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TABLE VI-1; The Reagan Budget Prqposals for Selected Entitlements, Fiscal ^84
 
(In Billions)_
 
1987 1988
1985 1986
1982 1983 1984
 General
 $236.8
$191.8 $205.9 $223.1
$154.1 $168.3 $178.2
Social security
 
74.5 83.4 93.1
46.6 53.0 59.8 67.5
 Medicare
 28.1
25.0 26.5
19.4 20.9 22.2 23.1
Civil service retirement
 20.1
16.8 17.4 18.4 19.3
14.9 16.1
Military retirement 8.0
7.7 7.9 7.4 6.8 7.7 7.3
 Other retirement
 
$242.7 ^266.2 $280.4
 $306.6 $331.5 $359.6 $386.1
 Total
 8.0% 1.9
8.0% 1 8.3% 8.0% 8.1% 8.0%
 Total as a share ofGNP
 
Low-income
 $25.4 $27.9 $30.6
$17.4 $19.4 $20.9 $23.2
Medicaid
 23.7 22.5
23.8 36.9 28.8 25.9 24.7
Unemployment compensation
 NA
11.6 11.8 NA
11.0 12.8 11.7
Food stamps NA
4.8 NA
4.6 5.0 4.6 4.7
 Child nutrition
 NA
 
7.7 8.8 7.8 8.6 8.7
Supplemental security income NA
 NA
7.4 7.5 NA
8.0 8.2 7.5
Aid to families with dependent children NA
$82.9 NA
$81.3 $81.4
$72.5 $91.1
Total
 
2.4% 2.9% 2.3% 2.1% ^0% NA NA
 Total as a share ofGNP
 
/
 
SOURCE: The Budget of the U.S., Fiscal 1984, Office of Management and Budget;
 
The National Journal, Vol. 6, February 5, 19.83, p. 271.
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TABLE VI-2; The Reagan Projected Impact of the. National Commission
 
Recommendations on Social Security Spending
 
(In Billions)
 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total 
OUTLAY REDUCTIONS $4.0 $4.4 $4.7 $5.1 $5.4 $23.6 
REVENUE INCREASES 8.3 5.6 8,9 10.7 22.3 55.7 
TOTAL SAVINGS $12.2 $10.0 $13.6 $15.8 $27.7 $79.4 
SOURCE: The National Journal, Vol. 6, Feb., 5, 1983, p, 271.
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Although not technically passed as a fiscal 1984 reconciliation
 
measure, the Reform Act was decidedly a part of the larger congressio
 
nal budget process. Substantial action on Social Security had been
 
deferred during the budget discussions for fiscal 1982, after Congress
 
had rejected President Reagan's requests for Social Security cutbacks.
 
The passage of the Act for fiscal 1984 is thus a culmination of that
 
earlier postponement.
 
In addition to its provisions concerning Social Security, the Reform
 
A.ct also mandated the replacement of the existing Medicare procedure
 
for hospital cost reimbursement by a costs-determined-in advance pro
 
cedure based on standardized rates for specific kinds of patient treat
 
ments and conditions. This replacement is designed to motivate hospitals
 
and medical facilities to reverse their uncontrolled increases in medi­
3
 
cal care expenses. The Act eliminated eligibility for Unemployment
 
Insurance benefits for non-professional employees of educational insti
 
tutions during their svimmer hiatus or other between term layoffs, when
 
those employees are reasonably certain to go back to work at the same
 
institution, among other UI adjustments. It also permanently shifted
 
the COLA for Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries to January.
 
These, and other combinations of structural and cosmetic adjustments,
 
though they are mainly modest-to-conservative changes, generally support
 
the thesis set forth in this paper. None of these changes by themselves
 
or even grouped together will turn the tide against uncontrollable en
 
titlement spending, but they do represent a solid beginning attempt,
 
and should be furthered as effective means toward the larger end of
 
congressional control of entitlement outlays growth.
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In summary, this thesis has examined entitlements as they are re
 
lated to the federal budget process and outcomes. It has defined exactly
 
what entitlements are, their nature within the budgetary process, the
 
major budgetary problems with entitlements, and CongressV current and
 
immediate future strategy options to deal with entitlements as part of
 
Congress' continuing package of budget uncontrollables. All of this has
 
been necessary to explore the major question posed by this paper: Is
 
Congress capable of controlling entitlement spending?
 
Control, in this thesis, has been defined as congressional ability,
 
under current law and the present structure of the budgetary process,
 
to enact effective constraints on the growth of federal spending for
 
entitlement programs. It is not seen as an issue of entitlement spending
 
growth versus no growth. Instead, the issue is undisciplined, unrestrai
 
ned growth versus the controlled, balanced growth of such spending. This
 
thesis has argued that without structural changes in the way entitlements
 
now fit within the budgetary process. Congress cannot control entitlement
 
spending. It is not just a lack of collective congressional will to tac
 
kle continued increases in entitlement spending that is the issue, but
 
rather a lack of real—as opposed to theoretical—structural capacity by
 
Congress to constrain the growth of entitlement spending.
 
The thesis has explored this central theme by emphasizing:
 
1. Entitlements, within the present federal budget, are special
 
status, relatively permanent programs providing benefits to
 
eligible individuals and governments who meet specified eligi
 
bility criteria. Entitlements provide benefits to help eligible
 
clients offset income losses to help those unable to care for
 
themselves, to make higher education, medical services and re
 
tirement income accessible to eligible recipients, etc. Currently
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there are some 35 major entitlement categories, and approximately
 
70 individual entitlement programs.
 
2. 	Within the budgetary process, once Congress officially authorizes
 
a program as an entitlement, the program becomes virtually self-

perpetuating and its funding automatic. The Appropriations process
 
becomes ineffective in constraining entitlement program outlays,
 
since the original authorizing legislation specifies eligibility
 
criteria, as-needed budget authority, and other characteristics
 
which obligate the government to finance the program based on
 
factors beyond congressional control (e.g., the rise in the elderly
 
population, high unemployment, etc.).
 
3. 	There are three structural components associated with virtually
 
every entitlement program: indexation, program interaction and
 
the number of beneficiaries. They singly and in combination, are
 
most responsible for the lack of congressional control over in
 
creased entitlement spending.
 
4. 	There are currently only two viable options available for Congress
 
to overcome its lack of control over entitlements: the reconcilia
 
tion procedure within the budgetary process, and structural changes
 
in the nature of entitlements within the budgetary process. Both
 
possess important advantages and disadvantages, the latter being
 
more dominant when either option is considered individually. In
 
combination, the two options offer the best probability for Con
 
gress to finally gain control over consistently increasing en
 
titlement spending.
 
5. 	Currently and for the immediate future, though many reform-

intended strategies exist to reduce federal entitlement outlays
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and gain control over the impact of such outlay spending on the
 
federal budget deficit, without the implementation of structural
 
change plans within the budgeting process, the other strategies
 
are destined to make only minor alterations in annual entitle
 
ment increases in spending. In effect, massive federal obliga
 
tions for entitlements will remain unconstrained, undisciplined
 
and uncontrolled.
 
Is Congress currently capable of controlling entitlement spending?
 
As shown particularly in Chapter V, Congress does not now have the ca
 
pacity, without enacting major structural changes in either the origi
 
nal legislated authorizations or associated laws, to impose consistent,
 
long-term fiscal discipline on the Social Security entitlement. Medi
 
care and Medicaid, farm price supports, interest on the public debt,
 
and, to a certain extent, unemployment compensation—the entitlements
 
which for long have dominated government entitlement expenditures. Con
 
tinued adherence to convenient but non-structural and essentially cos
 
metic adjustments will continue to result in the habitual frustrating
 
consequences: an out-of-control budget deficit and continued instability,
 
heightened uncertainty and unrestrained, automatic growth in entitle
 
ment outlays. And yes. Congress does have the capacity to control most
 
of the means-tested programs, the GSL Program, General Revenue Sharing,
 
and Veterans' Programs, though to date there has been a very inconsis
 
tent demonstration of this capacity because of a persistent lack of
 
will (as defined by the continuing existence and clout of entitlement
 
client groups, for example, maintaining the political lack of congres
 
sional motivation or willingness to either enact long-term fiscal re
 
straints or dismantle entitlement programs ).
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What capacity Congress does have relative to controlling entitle
 
ments virtually depends on its effectively confronting, at the very
 
least, the basic entitlement factors of indexation, interaction and
 
number of beneficiaries through its reconciliation/budget process. And
 
whatever conrols Congress tries tp employ will also be heavily impacted
 
by the prevailing state of the nation's economy.
 
The governmental triumph called the Social Security Reform Act of
 
1983 should be considered as at least one model of a successful begin
 
ning strategy which can eventually lead to congressional control of
 
entitlement spending. Approval of the Act demonstrated the potential
 
of the kind of bipartisan political support which will be necessary
 
to attain that control.
 
For Congress indeed can control the growth of entitlement spending
 
in the federal budget. Hopefully it will decide to do so in ways which
 
will neither substantively gut present entitlement programs nor continue
 
to over-target the means-tested programs designed to help the poor.
 
There is an imperative to gain such control and soon. Otherwise, there
 
is a very real danger of budget uncontrollables, especially entitle
 
ments, actually becoming the entire budget.
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